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I.   INTRODUCTION
Pawnbroking is a profession frequently misunderstood. While the ma-
jority of today’s pawnshops are clean, attractively maintained establish-
ments, the industry has difficulty shaking the “pawnbroker stigma.” The
composite image of the pawnbroker is that of a shady, unkempt, over-
weight character working out of a filthy, run-down, back street hock shop
with barred windows—a person who is involved in morally questionable
practices, such as providing continuing support to “druggies” and other
“low lifes” in exchange for pawns of stolen goods. Even the words
“pawnshop” and “pawnbroking” are frequently associated with such con-
cepts as “fenced property,” “sleaziness,” “shylocking,” and “usury.”
Many a consumer has considered visiting a pawnshop but then hesitated to do
so because of this pervasive stereotype. While public perception may continue
to identify pawnbrokers with the antiquated image of sleazy accomplices to
criminal activity, industry data show that less than one-tenth of one per-
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cent of all pawned property turns out to be stolen.1 The risk of buying
stolen property from a pawnbroker has been nearly eliminated through
strict reporting requirements and other laws governing stolen property, as
well as through the cooperative determination of members of the pawn-
broking profession to upgrade their image.2
This Article is an attempt to inform the reader about the rejuvenated
and changing pawnbroking industry, its regulation, its problems and con-
cerns, and the continuing controversies that surround it, through presen-
tation of anecdotes, data, legislative history, and statutory and case law.
In particular, Florida pawnbroking is highlighted.
II.   AND THEN THERE WERE PAWNSHOPS
Historically, pawnbroking is one of the oldest methods of lending
money. No recorded time in history exists when a loan of money on a
pledge has not been available.3 Its prevalence and importance is under-
scored by the assertion that “[i]f Queen Isabella of Spain had not ‘hocked’
her jewels in 1492, it is unlikely that Columbus would have made his
historic voyage to discover America.”4
By definition, a “pledge” and a “pawn” are virtually identical: a bail-
ment of personal property as security for payment of a debt for which the
holders of the property have an implied power of sale on default.5 In com-
mon business practice, the main differences are that “pawns” are limited to
                                                                                                         
1. Barry Newman, New Kids on the Block, FLA. PAWNBROKER, Fall 1994, at 22, 22.
2. Statutes such as FLA. STAT. §§ 538.04, .05 (1995) require pawnbrokers to pay close
attention to the sources of the pawns. Barry Newman, a fourth-generation pawnbroker in Jack-
sonville, Florida, exemplifies the attempt to dispel the stereotype:
Any hint of wrong and I sent [sic] the customer home without a transaction. Occa-
sionally the customer is insulted, but the result is a very high reputation, no police
citations and a very low rate of property seizures. Integrity is something you should
strive for . . . . You can bet that if you are charged with a crime as a pawnbroker, it
will be front page news. Remember, your customers will never forget.
Newman, supra note 1, at 22; see Mindy Steiner & Dev Strischek, Lending to Pawnshops, J.
COM. LENDING, Apr. 1992, at 43, 43.
3. PETER SCHWED, GOD BLESS PAWNBROKERS 21 (1975).
4. Equitable Securities Research, Purchase Recommendation, Cash America Interna-
tional, Inc., Oct. 5, 1993, at 2. And for the rest of the story, “Alfred Hardaker . . . relates
that one nineteenth century author facetiously remarked, ‘If Americans had duly reflected on
this incident . . . they certainly, with the stars and stripes had quartered the three balls in their
national flag.’ Although colorful, the story of Isabella pawning her jewels . . . is apparently
historically inaccurate . . . .” JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING, CHECK-CASHING
OUTLETS, PAWNSHOPS, AND THE POOR 15 (1994) (citations omitted).
5. See 54 AM. JUR. 2D Money Lenders and Pawnbrokers 1 (1971 & Supp. 1995);
WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 864, 903 (1989) (defining “pledge” and
“pawn”). Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, “pledge” could also be security
for performance of an obligation (as opposed to a loan). See FLA. STAT. §§ 538.04, 538.05,
671.201(37), 679.102, 679.305 (1995).
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tangible personal property, i.e., goods;6 whereas “pledges” may be either
tangible or intangible personal property, e.g., goods or commercial paper
and securities. On default, if the proceeds from the sale of a pledge are
not equal to the debt, the pledgee (creditor) may recover the sales defi-
ciency from the pledgor (debtor); if there is a sales surplus, the pledgor
may recover that from the pledgee.7 By contrast, a pawner is neither li-
able for any deficiency nor entitled to any surplus.8
The universal symbol representing a pawnshop, that of three golden
globes (or brass balls, depending on one’s outlook), is of debated origin,9
but the word “pawn” is derived from the French “pan,” which means the
skirt of a gown.10 Pan, in turn, is derived from the Latin word for cloth,
“pannum.”11 In fact, it has been reported that as recently as 1828, more
than one-half of the pawns in New York City were of articles of cloth-
ing.12 Based on casual personal surveys, most pawnshops today would
seem to have little relation to their lexicographical namesake. “Times
have changed,” according to a fourth-generation pawnbroker, “the on-
premises tailors have been long replaced by jewelers, gemologists and
watchmakers. All of the clothes are gone . . . .”13 The uniquely Floridian
exception would be the several pawnshops in the Daytona Beach area
which, during the spring of each year, are reputed to be loaded with
pawned “biker” regalia such as the “requisite” black leather motorcycle
jackets.14
                                                                                                         
6. As reported by Empire Loan Jewelers and Pawnbrokers of Boston, the “top ten” most
commonly pawned items are, in order of rank, gold rings, gold chains and bracelets, earrings,
VCRs, cameras, guitars and other musical instruments, gold watches, TVs, computers, and
fine art. Empire Pawn Lists “Top Ten,” TODAY’S PAWNBROKER, Summer 1994, at 48, 48.
7. FLA. STAT. § 679.504(2) (1995).
8. That is to say that the pawner is not personally liable for repayment of the amount re-
ceived for the pawn. While the pawner also loses, upon failure to repay the loan, the differ-
ence between the loan and the value of the goods, only the pawned goods are at risk.
9. See a discussion of the origin of the globes and a collection of authorities in Jarret C.
Oeltjen, Pawnbroking on Parade, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 751, 757 (1989) [hereinafter Oeltjen, Pa-
rade].
10. J. SHIPLEY, DICTIONARY OF WORD ORIGINS 263 (2d ed. 1945).
11. Id.
12. CASKEY, supra note 4, at 17.
13. Barry Newman, Ramblings of a Fourth-Generation Pawnbroker!, FLA. PAWNBROKER,
Fall 1994, at 15, 15. “The times have changed. My store is much different than my grandpa’s and
my dad’s. . . . I don’t sell or pawn clothes, hats and shoes. We specialize in fine jewelry although
we always try to keep a few clean electronic items as well as an array of weaponry.” Id.
In an informal survey in 1994 of the 441 pawnshop ads in the Tallahassee, Jacksonville,
St. Augustine, Tampa, Miami, and Orlando telephone directories, 248 of those ads speci-
fied a particular type of property to be pawned. Of these 248, 206 advertised for jewelry,
86 for guns, and 60 for electronics. See Natalie Nice, Survey of Florida Pawn Shop Adver-
tising (Apr. 1995) (unpublished Florida State University College of Law student survey, on
file with author).
14. Daytona Beach residents inform me that this is particularly the case following the na-
tionally famous “Bikers’ Week,” which is held in Daytona during the first week in March of
each year.
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Although philanthropically inclined individuals have long pooled their
funds to operate successful charitable pawnshops,15 most pawnshops are
operated with a profit motive in mind, even if it does not always work out
that way. Among the “for profits,” “ma and pa” pawnshop ownership is
the model, but this model is being challenged by the publicly held pawn-
shop chains. Of the four publicly traded pawnshop companies, Cash
America International16 is the industry’s pioneer and leader. As of June
30, 1995, Cash America operated a total of 369 pawnshops: 325 in 14
states of the U.S., 34 in the United Kingdom, and 10 in Sweden.17 The
second largest pawnshop chain, EZCorp, has approximately 250 shops in
nine states.18 Another, Super Pawn, has become the first foreign (non-
Mexican) pawnshop to receive permission to set up shop in Mexico.19
With modernization of business practices20 and organizations, pawn-
shops have become a growth industry, especially in the southern United
                                                                                                         
15. Jarret C. Oeltjen, Pawnbroking: An Historical, Comparative Perspective, 8 ARIZ. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 53, 68 (1991). Two examples cited are the Massachusetts Pawners’ Bank of
Boston, later named the Collateral Loan Company, and New York’s Provident Loan Society.
Id. at 68-69.
16. What is now Cash America International, Inc. (Cash America) was founded in 1983
by Jack R. Daugherty, who had owned and operated pawnshops since 1971. His private com-
pany, begun with one pawnshop in 1983, was incorporated in 1984 and went public in 1987.
Mr. Daugherty has been Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Cash America
since its founding. From that humble beginning, Cash America “proudly loaned its billionth
dollar in June 1994 . . . .” CASH AMERICA INTERNATIONAL, INC., 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 6
(1995). See RAYMOND JAMES & ASSOCIATES, SOUTHEAST/FLORIDA RESEARCH BUREAU,
SUMMARY UPDATE REPORT (June 5, 1995).
17. CASH AMERICA INTERNATIONAL, INC., THIRD QUARTER REPORT (1995). Of these
outlets, 49 are in Florida. Id.
18. JAMES & ASSOCIATES, supra note 16, at 4; 60 STANDARD & POOR’S, STANDARD
NASDAQ STOCK REPORTS §16, No. 109 (9/23/94, 3769K).
19. Until the new ventures open, the Mexican government has a pawnshop monopoly; all
the stores are government-owned and run. Super Pawn, which has been extended a $10 million
line of credit by a Mexican bank, has put expansion plans on hold because of the devaluation
of the peso. Super Pawn Still North of the Border, TODAY’S PAWNBROKER, Summer 1995, at 42,
42.
20. For example, as a leader in pawnbroking technology, Cash America International,
Inc. utilizes a computer network to value pawns, track merchandise inventory levels, and trace
borrowers’ repayment histories. Interview with Mary Jackson, Public Relations Officer, Cash
America International, Inc., in Fort Worth, Tex. (Jan. 19, 1996).
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States.21 Contemporary estimates are that as many as one of every ten
adult Americans borrows money from a pawnshop each year.22
III.   PAWNBROKING SUFFERS AN IDENTITY CRISIS
Pawnbroking has long suffered from the negative image pictured in lit-
erature, the movies, and the media.23 Without a pictorial history or other
survey of a diverse sample of pawnbroking outlets, one is left with the
less than savory images generated from the various anecdotal accounts.
The only positive accounts are those that feature relieved pawners re-
deeming their pawns from bondage after their personal crises have
passed. There are no images of pawners who are pleased that they have
an instant source of credit, nor of buyers reveling in the bargains they
have found among forfeited goods. Images of happy, well-adjusted pawn-
brokers interacting with their families have yet to be portrayed.24
Contemporary industry literature, such as Today’s Pawnbroker,25 Na-
tional Pawnbroker,26 and various state association journals,27 stresses the
advantages of, and necessity for, positive public relations28 to help achieve
                                                                                                         
21. According to data from a spring 1990 report authored for the Federal Reserve Bank
of Kansas City (FRB Report) (Spring 1990), in 1911, there were 1976 licensed pawnshops in
the U.S., one for every 47,000 Americans. In 1988, there were 6900 licensed pawnshops, one
for every 35,700 persons. Today, there are approximately 9000 pawnshops, which is about
one for every 28,400 residents. CASKEY, supra note 4, at 47. The FRB Report also noted that
the number of pawnshops in the urban Northeast declined, while the South, Southeast, and
Central Mountain states were responsible for most of the growth. The growth of pawnbroking
in these areas was attributed to less restrictive usury laws, increased poverty, and below-
average levels of education. Id. (Professor Caskey was also one of the authors of the FRB Re-
port).
22. Annetta Miller, Pawnshops Make a Comeback, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 1990, at 44, 44.
23. It would be interesting to study what the economic impact of this “negative image”
has been. One could posit that this image—so in contrast with the stuffiness of the more
“conventional” financial institutions—could have been an asset in times prior to the coming of
the financial institutions’ “consumer relations” departments.
24. Walt Disney could have sent Mary Poppins to the home of a pawnbroker to bring
harmony to that household.
25. Published by BKB Publications, Inc.
26. The official publication of the National Pawnbrokers Association.
27. E.g., The Florida Pawnbroker, the official publication of the Florida Pawnbrokers
Ass’n, Inc. At the time of publication, there are at least 41 state pawnbroker associations. For
a current list with references to a contact person for each, see State Ass’n Contacts, NAT’L
PAWNBROKER, Fall 1995, at 63, 63.
28. "It’s time to take the next step in changing our image, by hiring a public relations
firm. With the superior service we have in our staff, . . . as well as by hiring additional public
relations professionals to help us, we can truly change our image around.” Bob Stogner, Mes-
sage from the President . . . Professional Public Relations, NAT’L PAWNBROKER, Fall 1993, at
3, 3.
"At this point, the pawn industry has no credibility. This must change immediately. Tell the
pawnbroker story. Get a copy of the NPA’s new public relations slide presentation, ‘20th
Century Pawnbroker,’ and show it to your city councilors, law enforcement officials, civic
clubs and congressional representatives.” Charles Jones, Chairman’s Message, NAT’L
PAWNBROKER, Summer 1994, at 6, 6.
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recognition of industry respectability29 and to shed the negative stereo-
type. To improve the pawnbroking image, much energy is being spent by
the state and national pawnbroking associations as well as the national
chains and the local stores. Numerous articles in trade association journals
discuss ideas and proffer recommendations for improvement: working
with the local media to foster understanding;30 taking an active role in
community affairs;31 creating a local business advisory board32 or a news-
letter;33 upscaling store image with improved lighting,34 attractive inte-
rior35 and exterior36 signs, and an absence of bars.37 For at least one
                                                                                                         
29. "Right now, 85 percent of my business is with women between the ages of 21 and 42.
This is something that has surprised me and I believe it is because the pawn industry is gaining
more and more recognition as being an honorable business.” People ‘n Pawn: Jim Starnes,
American Loan Exchange, Greenville, S.C., NAT’L PAWNBROKER, Fall 1993, at 38, 38.
30. In Crown Point, Indiana, the arrest of a pawnshop patron who later admitted to 40
burglaries could have been a public relations disaster, but the pawnbroker called the local
newspaper and asked whether it would like to know the rest of the story and how a pawnshop
operates. After an affirmative response and the scheduling of interviews, a front-page story,
Police and Pawn Brokers on Same Side of the Law, was published. Media Watch, TODAY’S
PAWNBROKER, Spring 1995, at 35, 35 [hereinafter Media Watch].
On the other hand, a pawnbroker in Rifle, Colorado (on the west slope of the Colorado
Rockies), whose shop hosted “Psycho Brain Food,” a live, swap-shop radio program, may be
using the media to perpetuate the pawnshop stereotype. “I tell people, ‘Drive by, flip me the
bird, let me know you’re alive.’ And they do,” says disc jockey Doug Lauderdale.
“Everybody wants to flip somebody the bird, and they hear this guy on the radio telling them
to come by and flip him.” R.G. Edmonson, Pawnshop on the Air, TODAY’S PAWNBROKER,
Fall 1995, at 34, 34.
31. "One of the most effective ways that all pawnshops can proactively overcome precon-
ceived images of the industry is to give back to and take an active role in the communities
where they make their living.” Nancy Michaels, Creating a Connection in Your Community,
NAT’L PAWNBROKER, Summer 1995, at 16, 16 (Nancy Michaels is President of Impression
Impact, a marketing consulting firm).
32. Nancy Michaels, Self-Made in America, NAT’L PAWNBROKER, Fall 1995, at 14, 14.
33. Nancy Michaels, Creating a Newsletter with Impact, NAT’L PAWNBROKER, Winter
1995, at 40, 40.
34. "There are also pawnbrokers who haven’t heard the word—there are still nasty-
looking, dimly-lit stores. Same goes for friendly service: the store that gave me the surliest
service also was one of the most slovenly-looking. I don’t think the two were unrelated.” R.G.
Edmonson, Pawnbrokers Spruce Up To Change Their Image, TODAY’S PAWNBROKER, Winter
1994, at 6, 9 [hereinafter Edmonson, Spruce].
35. Id. at 9:
Somewhere back in the Dark Ages, some printer made a fortune selling pawnbrokers
a package of signs that contain every negative in the book: No Refunds, No Personal
Checks, No Layaways, etc.
. . . .
The message [sent by these signs] reminds me of the old joke: “No drinking, no
eating, no loud music, no dancing. Now, you all have a good time.” These signs
have so many negatives in them, I think the real message is clear: “No customers."
36. Id. at 10:
“We have this penchant for seeing how large we can make the word ‘pawn,’” White
said. [Bill White, Vice President for Public Affairs, Cash America International]. He
said any neighborhood quickly learns whether the new business down the street is a
pawnshop, but some stores have signs the size of highway billboards to advertise the
fact. “It’s an affront to the community.”
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pawnbroker, these lessons paid off; Pacific Pawnbrokers was named 1993
Business of the Year by the Sparks, Nevada Chamber of Commerce.38
Yet, in spite of extensive public relations efforts, the negative portrait
lingers; pawnshops continue to be cast as “nuisance businesses,”39 in the
company of tattoo shops and massage parlors,40 and somewhere in rank
between liquor stores and houses of prostitution.41 A recent Eleventh Cir-
cuit case reported that “pawnshops do facilitate the disposition of stolen
property . . . .”42 An Aurora, Colorado City Council bill relating to the
location and licensing of pawnbrokers presents this summation: pawn-
shops “ ‘have deleterious or blighting effects which pose a danger to the
public health, safety and welfare. . . .’ “43
Pawnshops also continue to fall prey to local development and zoning
authorities.44 Limitation of proliferation is a common ordinance theme
                                                                                                         
37. Both interior and exterior security is possible without the traditional iron bars. For
exterior security, several solutions are available: glass laminated with plastic, roll-down shut-
ters or small windows through which a person could not squeeze. See id. at 6. A recent inno-
vation, Safetell, Security Corporation’s rising security screen, has made interior bars and even
the bulletproof cages obsolete.
Installed into the counter-tops of businesses, the rising barrier allows for a friendly,
open customer service counter. Yet, in the event of a threatening robbery, the cash-
ier can activate a screen that rises to the ceiling in less than half a second
. . . .
. . . [T]he Safetell rising security screen is constructed of carbon steel and anti-
ricochet, high-density composite armor. It can withstand close range firings from a
.44 magnum, officials say.
. . . .
. . . The screen, although new to the U.S., has been installed in more than 2,500
locations across the U.K. and Australia.
New Products: Security System Starts Counter Revolution, TODAY’S PAWNBROKER, Summer
1995, at 36, 36.
38. "The chamber of commerce award may have been a first for a pawnshop, but
Schlader [the owner] was not there to receive it . . . . [Because he] didn’t suspect his business
could possibly win, . . . he was out of town on a golfing weekend.” News Notes: Pacific
Pawnbrokers Local “Business of Year,” TODAY’S PAWNBROKER, Summer 1994, at 37, 38.
39. "Philadelphia has begun to crack down on ‘nuisance businesses,’ pawnshops and
check-cashing stores included, by more aggressive enforcement of zoning laws by the city’s
Department of Licensing and Inspection.” News Notes: Pawnshops Called “Nuisance,”
TODAY’S PAWNBROKER, Fall 1995, at 42, 42.
40. A few months after an Indiana newspaper printed a news story about a pawnshop pa-
tron’s arrest and confession to multiple burglaries, a letter to the editor of the newspaper
warned “that the presence of a pawnshop was the precursor to an invasion of all kinds of unsa-
vory businesses: tattoo shops and massage parlors.” Media Watch, TODAY’S PAWNBROKER,
Spring 1995, at 35, 35.
41. "A move is afoot within the Anchorage Assembly to punish pawnbrokers by creating
rules that would render their social status to a level somewhere between liquor stores and
houses of prostitution.” State Association News, NAT’L PAWNBROKER, Fall 1993, at 55, 55.
42. Cash Inn of Dade, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 938 F.2d 1239, 1242 (11th
Cir. 1991).
43. State Association News: Warning, Warning, NAT’L PAWNBROKER, Summer 1994, at
63, 63.
44. The general power to affect pawnshops and other real estate and business entities is
under FLA. STAT. § 538.17 (1995) (“Nothing in this chapter shall preclude political subdivi-
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from Las Vegas to Baltimore.45 The justification, when made, often rests
on the burden that pawnshops are said to place on law enforcement.46 In
addition to density limits, pawnshops are often zoned out of upscale
neighborhoods47 or areas frequented by people the regulators fear may be
victimized by pawnbrokers, e.g., gamblers in the vicinity of casinos.48
                                                                                                         
sions of the state and municipalities from enacting laws more restrictive than the provisions of
this chapter.”).
45. In 1994, the city of Baltimore drafted a new ordinance that would limit pawnshops to
42, the current number; it also increased the bond requirement from $10,000 to $50,000. New
Pawnshop Laws Passed Around Country, TODAY’S PAWNBROKER, Fall 1994, at 36, 36
[hereinafter New Laws]. “[Officials are] concerned that Baltimore County will be overrun with
pawnshops since an ordinance last year limited the number of stores in the city of Baltimore.”
County Moves To Curtail Pawnshops, TODAY’S PAWNBROKER, Summer 1995, at 40, 41. “In
February the county council imposed a six-month moratorium on new pawnshops [in the city
of Baltimore], and solicited recommendations from the county planning board.” Id. at 40.
46. "The Fairfax, Virginia City Council has voted to limit the number of pawnshops to
one; there is one store in the city now.” New Laws, supra note 45, at 36. The burden placed
on police department resources is cited as the reason for the limit. Id.
On the other hand, some police officers state that pawnshops make their job easier.
"It’s meeting a need,” says Sgt. Raymond Henry, of the Tallahassee Police Depart-
ment’s burglary unit. “If they all closed down, I think the crime rate would go up as
far as racketeering and fencing, because there would be no legitimate means for
these people to get money and they would use these illicit means to get money."
Averil Guiste, Pawns in the Game of Commerce, TALL. DEM., Jan. 2, 1994, at C2.
47. News Notes: Relocation Bid Rejected, TODAY’S PAWNBROKER, Winter 1994, at 41,
41:
City commissioners in Royal Oak, Mich., . . . turned down a bid by [a pawnshop
dealing only in jewelry] to relocate in their city.
. . . .
. . . The main opposition came from a neighborhood association led by one of the
commissioners. That city official lived two blocks from the proposed store, and [was
said to have stated that] she was determined not to have a pawnshop in her neighbor-
hood.
48. News Notes: Casino Gambling Produces Pawnshop Boom, TODAY’S PAWNBROKER,
Winter 1994, at 40, 40-41:
Casinos and pawnshops in Louisiana are becoming good neighbors, since casino
gambling recently was legalized. In Bossier City, La., pawn transactions increased
72 percent between May and August according to police records, said the Shreveport
(La.) Times. Individual pawnbrokers reported business up 10 to 30 percent.
. . . .
[It was noted by one pawnshop owner] that most of his patrons are from Texas.
News Notes: Big Easy Hard on Pawnbrokers, TODAY’S PAWNBROKER, Summer 1995, at 41,
41:
New Orleans . . . is trying to restrict pawnshops, to keep them away from gambling
casinos and the tourists who patronize them. According to newspaper reports, city
officials have imposed a moratorium on new stores in the central business district,
and proposed an ordinance that would exclude new stores from the tourist-portions
of downtown, including the French Quarter.
"If the city fathers are concerned about a penniless patron who leaves a casino to pawn his
watch, they also should be as concerned about that patron withdrawing his bank account from
an ATM.” Id. at 42.
"Clark County commissioners banned pawnshop advertising along the Las Vegas Strip. The
commission also turned down a pawnshop application by a jewelry store already in business on
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Contemporary “service” expansions may continue to taint the public’s
perceptions of pawnshops. Two recent entrepreneurial variations on exist-
ing themes, designed to increase customers and profitability, bring new
controversy to pawnbroking: automobile title pawns49 and advancing
money on personal checks under the guise of check cashing.50 Much of
                                                                                                         
the Strip.” News Notes: Give and Take in Las Vegas, TODAY’S PAWNBROKER, Fall 1995, at 41,
41.
49. The very term “title pawn” is an anomaly. The basic notion of pawn is that of a
pledge of personal property, the result of which is to transfer the possession of that property to
the pledgee or pawnbroker. In the traditional sense, if an automobile is pawned, both the
automobile and its title are going to be in the possession of the pawnbroker.
As title pawns have developed,
[i]n exchange for a loan, the borrower signs over his title and hands over a set of
keys. The borrower then pays a monthly fee of as much as 22 percent [the Florida
statutory maximum] until the loan amount is repaid. Say you need $500. You would
pay a fee of $110 a month until you repaid the loan. If you kept the loan six months,
the fees alone would total $660. None of that money would be earmarked to pay off
the underlying loan; you would still owe the initial $500. If you can’t make your
payments, the lender eventually can repossess your car.
Tim Gray, Title Lenders Get Keys To Drive a Hard Bargain, ST. PETE. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1995,
at H2.
[In a true car pawn situation], you would no more let [the owner of the automobile]
drive as you would let him wear his [pawned] watch. . . . [T]he possessory aspect of
our industry allows us to charge the rates we do. Unlike a bank, our overhead costs
must include storage, insurance and handling of the items we pawn, not to mention
the credibility of our customers in general.
. . . .
. . . By allowing the customer to hold onto the item, or to drive it, we may damage
our ability to earn these rates . . . .
. . . .
To put it simply, you can’t pawn a title.
. . . .
. . . Those of you who do not pawn cars are still at risk from those calling them-
selves pawnbrokers and acting like loansharks.
Cameron Swanson, Can’t You Just Hold the Title?, NAT’L PAWNBROKER, Summer 1994, at 30,
30.
A “title pawn” is indistinguishable from an Article 9 secured transaction. Should Article 9
apply or the exceptions found in the pawnbroker statute? The distinctive differences in treat-
ment is discussed, infra notes 60-72 and accompanying text.
50. Ric Blum, Check-Cashers . . . Friend or Foe?, NAT’L PAWNBROKER, Summer 1994,
at 16, 16 (Ric Blum is president of the Ohio Pawnbrokers Ass’n):
Lately a new twist has developed. [C]heck-cashers are getting into the loan business.
. . . A [traditional] check-casher derives most of his income from fees charged for
cashing checks.
. . . .
Check-cashers are [now] making loans on personal checks. There are many names
for this—check-holding, cashing postdated checks, payday loans. . . . Check-cashers
around the country find this very profitable.
. . . .
A check-casher might ask you to write a check for $125 in order for you to receive
$100 in cash. They agree to hold your check for a period of time (often two weeks),
until you can cover it. At the end of two weeks, the check is cashed at a bank.
To obtain such a loan is simple. Usually you must show your last two pay stubs, your last two
months’ bank statements, and personal identification. Many require a “loan” application and
1004 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:995
the industry eschews these “innovations” and the revenues and ill will
they generate.51
Title loans have been prohibited in a few states52 and authorized in oth-
ers.53 In Florida, where such loans have recently been authorized,54 pawn-
brokers have actively sought to divorce themselves from the title “pawn
lenders”55 and with good cause; a recent newspaper article commented,
                                                                                                         
some even run a credit check at the customer’s expense. To the consumer, this may be an at-
tractive alternative to pawning goods. Here the customer receives the loan and does not have to
give up any property. That is probably worth the slightly higher fees involved. Id.
One big difference between this transaction and a pawn, is, if you default on a pawn,
there will be no legal recourse (except forfeiture of your item). What happens if you
make a deposit and the checks won’t clear? Fines, penalties, warrants, jail, lawyer
fees, ruined credit ratings.
Id. Generally pawners do not harbor ill will against a pawnbroker when goods are forfeited for
failure to redeem. Such would not be the case if the held check bounced and collection proce-
dures and the possible civil and criminal penalties were levied. Id. at 18.
51. See supra notes 49-51. Of the two, the title “pawn” (loan) is the most worrisome to
pawnbrokers because it is immediately identified with them. In Florida, when the title loan in-
dustry sought to be legitimatized, pawnbrokers insisted that the title loan industry be prohibited
from using the pawn, pawner, pawnshop, pawnbroker lingo. See infra note 56; FLA. STAT. §
538.15(5) (1995). 
On the other hand, check cashing in whatever form is not limited to pawnshops. Even your
friendly neighborhood grocery store cashes checks. Nor do the vast majority of check cashers
engage in questionable activities.
52. See, e.g., Auto Pawn vs. Title Pawn, NAT’L PAWNBROKER, Winter 1995, at 18, 18
(discussing a 1994 Colorado Attorney General opinion); La. Acts 1062, § 1801 (1995); Steven
M. Geary, Missouri’s Pawnshop Law, J. MO. B., July-Aug. 1994, at 201 (discussing changes
to the laws affecting pawnshops in Missouri).
53. Title loans have been authorized or permitted in a number of jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
Floyd v. Title Exch. & Pawn of Anniston, Inc., 620 So. 2d 576 (Ala. 1993); 1995, Fla. Laws
ch. 95-287; O.C.G.A. § 44-12-131 (Supp. 1995) (Georgia); TENN. REV. STAT. § 45-15-101
(1995); NEV. REV. STAT. §244.348 (1993). Most states have not yet considered this issue.
54. 1995, Fla. Laws ch. 95-287; see also infra notes 141-43, 201-08 and accompanying
text.
55. News Notes: Title Loans Come to Florida, TODAY’S PAWNBROKER, Fall 1995, at 37, 37:
"We fought it, but we knew title loans were going to come in,” said Ruth Barnett,
executive director of the Florida Pawnbrokers Association [FPA]. The group turned
back an effort to legalize title pawns in 1993. This year [1995] FPA helped write the
bill and imposed some restrictions on vehicle loans.
[The 1995 enactment] prohibits title loan businesses from using the term “pawn,”
“pawnbroker,” or any of the pawn symbols in their names, advertising or any other
presentation to the public. . . ."That separated the title loan people from the pawn-
brokers,” Barnett said . . . . “There are a number of government agencies that are
watching [title loans] very closely."
In Georgia, where the term “title pawns” is freely used, the entire pawn industry is painted
with the stigma created by the title loan segment of the industry. For example, “a growing
number of dissatisfied customers . . . have filed lawsuits against an industry that has grown so
lucrative it has spawned pawn chains. Two of them [EZ Cash and Cash America] are listed on
the New York Stock Exchange.” Shelly Emling, More Borrowers Challenge Car-Title Pawn
Practices, ATLANTA CONST., Sept. 24, 1994, at C9. Cash America does not make automobile
title loans. Interview with Hugh Simpson, General Counsel, Cash America International, Inc.,
in Tallahassee, Fla. (Nov. 13, 1995).
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“Like a B-movie monster, car-title lenders just won’t go away.”56 Auto-
mobile title loans are just that: loans secured by possession of the auto-
mobile title and not the automobile.57 Two clarifications need to be made.
First, there can be, and still is, a true auto pawn, in which possession of a
vehicle is delivered to a pawnbroker;58 in fact, some pawnshops are spe-
cializing in automobiles.59 Second, in many respects, a title loan is virtu-
ally indistinguishable from a more traditional loan using an automobile as
collateral, i.e., a “secured transaction.”60 In the traditional setting, as in
the title loan arena, the customer/borrower retains possession, and the
lender notes its security interest on the title and retains possession of that
title.61 However, these two forms of the same type of title transaction are
also very different in cost to the borrower and degree of protection of the
borrower’s interest.62
A conventional loan using an automobile as collateral would be subject
to the Florida usury law and its eighteen percent per annum interest ceil-
                                                                                                         
56. Gray, supra note 49, at H1. With emphasis on the up to 300% per annum service
charge authorized by the Legislature, the reporter refers to title lenders as “vacuum lenders”
and “predators.” Id. The bill that successfully authorized title loans was introduced by Repre-
sentative Ed Healey, a West Palm Beach Democrat who “calls his measure pro-consumer.” Id.
57. “‘Title loan’ means a loan of money secured by bailment of a certificate of title to a
motor vehicle. A title loan is not a pawn if the secondhand dealer does not maintain physical
possession of the vehicle throughout the term of the transaction.” FLA. STAT. § 583.03(1)(i)
(1995).
It is unlawful to “[u]se the word ‘pawn’ or ‘pawnbroker’ in any transaction, documentation,
advertising or promotional materials, signs, displays, banners, or other materials of any nature
relating to the secondhand dealer’s business if the secondhand dealer engages in title loan
transactions.” Id. § 538.15(5).
58. In Florida, if the pawnbroker retains possession of the automobile, it is not a “title
loan” subject to the title loan rules. Id. §§ 538.03(i), .06(5)(a). Indeed, one cannot “[e]ngage
in both pawn transactions and title loan transactions from the same secondhand dealer loca-
tion.” Id. § 538.15(4).
59. Jeff Kramer, Loaner Cars, A Pawnshop Where the Owners Drive In, but Usually
Walk Out, L.A. TIMES, June 17, 1993, at J1 (“If it has wheels and an engine, we’ll take it.”);
Kelly Kroeninger, Denver-Based U.S. PAWN Leads Trend Toward Pawning Cars for Cash
Loans, DENVER BUS. J., Dec. 11, 1989, at V41 n.12, § 1.
60. Cf. FLA. STAT. §§ 679.104, 671.201(37) (1995).
61. Section 679.203, Florida Statutes, requires a security agreement; section
679.302(3)(b), Florida Statutes, requires the security interest to be “perfected” by compliance
with the automobile certificate of title statute, which requires notation of the creditor’s interest
on the automobile title, id. § 319.27(1), and possession of the title by the lienholder, id. §
319.24(3).
Chapter 538, Florida Statutes, has no express requirement of an agreement for title loans.
However, by implication, a “[customer] shall sign a statement verifying that [the customer] is
the rightful owner of the goods or is entitled to . . . pledge the goods,” id. § 538.04(3), and
reasonableness would dictate that requirement. Likewise, the title lender would want its inter-
est noted on the title in accordance with section 319.27(1), and it must have possession of the
title, although it cannot have possession of the automobile. Id. § 538.06(5)(a), (b).
62. Mark Canning, an official in the Florida Department of Banking and Finance, has
stated that Department personnel are investigating ways to make the title loan act more con-
sumer-friendly. Gray, supra note 49, at H2.
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ing.63 A title loan is subject to a twenty-two ceiling, that is, twenty-two
percent per month.64
If the debtor defaults on either its secured loan or on its title loan, the
respective lender has repossession of the collateral as an available rem-
edy.65 But here the similarity ends. First, the repossession of secured loan
collateral is expressly subject to the “no breach of the peace rule,”66
which the repossession of title loan collateral is not.67 Second, the secured
loan collateral can be sold only at a commercially reasonable sale after
reasonable notification to the debtor,68 while the only restriction on the
sale of title loan collateral is that it be sold through a licensed motor ve-
hicle dealer,69 an illusory protection at best.70 Finally, upon sale of se-
cured loan collateral, the debtor is entitled to any surplus of the sales pro-
ceeds over the loan balance plus expenses of sale and repossession, but
the debtor is also liable for any deficiency.71 After repossession of title
loan collateral, the debtor is neither entitled to a sales surplus nor liable
for a sales deficiency.72
An additional relationship that is not likely to earn positive “points” in
a public relations game is that which the pawn industry has with the gun
industry. “There are more than 15,000 pawnshops in the United States (of
these, more than 12,000 are federal firearms licensees).”73
                                                                                                         
63. FLA. STAT. § 687.03 (1995). The most significant exception to this limit is for lend-
ers licensed under the Consumer Finance Act, chapter 516, Florida Statutes. This exception
permits a 30% per annum charge for the first $1000 loaned; 24% for an amount exceeding
$1000 but not exceeding $2000; and 18% for those amounts exceeding $2000 but not exceed-
ing $25,000 (the most a licensee may lend under the usury exceptions created by the statute).
Id. § 516.031(1).
64. Id. § 538.06(5)(e).
65. Compare id. § 679.503(1) with id. § 538.06(d).
66. Id. § 679.503.
67. See id. § 679.501(2), (3).
68. Id. § 679.504(3).
69. Id. § 538.06(d). The licensing requirements for a motor vehicle dealer are not par-
ticularly onerous, but they do offer some measure of protection to those who have transactions
with the dealer. See id. § 320.27.
70. Id. § 538.16. Compare the title loan redemption (with its absolute 60- or 90-day cut-
off) with the secured transactions redemption rights, which grant the debtor the right to redeem
the property until it is sold, a contract is made for its sale, the debtor signs a written waiver
after default, or the creditor has taken the property, without objection from the debtor, as pay-
ment in full for the obligation. Id. § 679.506. But any protection that this “limitation” is to the
defaulting debtor is purely illusory. At the time the dealer is to sell the automobile, the debtor
has already given up her rights to redeem. See id. § 538.16.
71. Id. § 679.504(2).
72. Id. § 538.16.
73. Jones, supra note 28, at 6. “Pawnshops make most of their money from jewelry and
guns . . . .” Edmonson, Spruce, supra note 34, at 10 (noting that the pawnbroker who was to
be interviewed “even thought about where the newspaper’s photographer should make a pic-
ture: not standing in front of the gun display, because that would be projecting the wrong im-
age”); see also Media Watch, supra note 30, at 57. When gun control legislation was passed
that mistakenly, it was argued, governed pawns of guns, Bill White, discussing the possibility
of litigation, stated:
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Still, standard check-cashing services74 and new ventures, such as
electronic tax filing and the ancillary refund anticipation loan,75 have sig-
nificant earning potential for the pawnbroker,76 and they are viewed as
valuable consumer services that pose little, if any, downside public rela-
tions risk.
                                                                                                         
Can you conceive of a scenario where guns and pawnshops in court against a fed-
eral agency would do anything but damage our image further? Being right doesn’t
mean you’re going to win. If you win, you must determine what you won. You
didn’t win any friends. It is rare that someone gets beat and doesn’t want retribu-
tion. Many Brady proponents serve on other committees that could create serious
grief for the industry.
Bill White, The Brady Report—A Wake-up Call, NAT’L PAWNBROKER, Summer 1994, at 52,
53.
74. "Customers do repeatedly mention convenience, not cost, in conversations about the
pros and cons of check cashers.” Tim Gray, Cashing In on Checks, ST. PETE. TIMES, Nov.
26, 1995, at H6. Conveniences such as free money orders, longer office hours than banks
(including all day Saturday and part of Sunday), and cashing the checks of almost any cus-
tomer are mentioned as drawing cards. Id.
At least one check casher has a mobile check-cashing unit. “In addition to serving employees
near the job site, the armored car [mobile check-cashing unit] also goes into three public
housing neighborhoods at the first of the month to cash checks for residents . . . [who] feel
belittled if they go to a bank because they don’t have much money.” Rolling Bank in Macon
Cashes Checks on the Go, ATLANTA CONST., Aug. 23, 1993, at State News.
By virtue of legislation effective July 1, 1994, Florida check cashers are to register with the
Florida Department of Banking and Finance. FLA. STAT. §§ 560.302-.310 (1995). As of Octo-
ber 30, 1995, only 284 applications had been received. It is perceived that there are “a lot” of
unregistered businesses still operating in Florida. Telephone Interview with Marilyn Meyers,
Florida Department of Banking and Finance (Nov. 15, 1995) (informal interview conducted by
Florida State University Law School student Josette Chack-On, notes on file with author).
75. It was estimated that there would be 25 million electronic filers in 1995. “What drives
most electronic filing is the next-day ‘refund’ that people get. That refund actually is a loan
that some banks make against the IRS’s promise that a refund is due. When taxpayers qualify
for earned income credit, that refund can total $1,000, $1,200, or more.” R.G. Edmonson,
Pawnbrokers May Find the Future Is Spelled “ETF,” TODAY’S PAWNBROKER, Fall 1994, at
14, 14. If the pawnbroker has the ability to cash the refund check, the customer may spend a
portion of it for merchandise in the pawnshop. Id.
A Lightning Tax Service representative opines that
Every pawnbroker should be in the tax business. . . . It’s easy to get started. “Our
company and software cover all the bases to get a pawnbroker going in the fast re-
fund business. We have excellent customer service, so when someone has questions,
he or she can easily get them answered. Our software does the tax preparation by
basically walking the operator through the return, then prints the federal and state
returns, electronically files the tax report and provides a Refund Anticipation Loan.
Almost all of our checks are back in one day. The client of a pawnbroker wants his
refund fast, just like everybody else. A pawnbroker has an advantage, because he
has a built-in customer base that he deals with year-round, whereas a tax service is
closed most of the year."
Tracet Raule, Vendors in Pawn, NAT’L PAWNBROKER, Winter 1995, at 62, 62.
76. In Florida, check cashers may charge the greater of five dollars or three percent of
the face amount of public assistance checks (four percent without identification); the greater of
five dollars or five percent of the face amount of other payment instruments (six percent with-
out identification); and the greater of five dollars or ten percent of the face amount of personal
checks or money orders. FLA. STAT. § 560.309 (1995).
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IV.   PAWNBROKERS: IMPORTANT PLAYERS IN THE CONSUMER CREDIT
ECONOMY77
Pawnshops usually offer small, secured loans that average sixty dollars
and have a short maturation period; the customer’s personal property
serves as the collateral.78 Pawnshops provide a vital service to an increasingly
growing segment of the population: those whose questionable credit histo-
ries exclude them from such mainstream credit institutions as banks and
credit unions. Most pawnshop customers do not have the option to acquire
instant cash advances from the ATM machine with their credit cards,
checking account overdraft loans from banks or credit unions, or loans from
a consumer finance company.
But, while pawnshops have typically been the “bankers” for lower-
income individuals, they are now offering assistance to an increasing num-
ber of middle-class customers. These “new” customers, perhaps hard hit by
recession-related layoffs, bankruptcies, and foreclosures, have found pawn-
shops to be very convenient “lender[s] of last resort.”79 Pawnbrokers state
that their customers feel compelled to tell them why they are pawning their
possessions and that, instead of borrowing to finance luxuries such as vaca-
tions, “[t]hey’re borrowing $500 for food on the table”80 or “to satisfy an
unexpected need, pay bills or buy groceries.”81 Another pawnbroker com-
mented, “We have a lot of people come in here with sick kids and they need
a prescription or food or Pampers, and where are they going to get it?”82
In addition, a minority of pawnshops across the country cater to high-
income clients who hold high status jobs and good credit ratings, but who
need an immediate (and, many times, discreet) infusion of cash.83 A Texas
pawnbroker testifies, “Most of my customers are real estate people, oilmen,
retailers, restaurant owners. . . . I’m dealing with a businessman who needs
cash flow for say, ten days. . . .”84 As a Nashville lender further explains,
“When they need extra cash—it may be for just a week or a month or two
                                                                                                         
77. In his recent book, Professor Caskey notes that in total dollars, pawnbrokers provide
less than one percent of consumer credit in the United States. However, since the median loans
are quite small (about $60), pawnshops serve millions of customers each year. Caskey esti-
mates this to be “perhaps as much as 10 percent of the adult population.” CASKEY, supra note
4, at 49.
78. Id.; Pawns in the Game of Recession, JEWELERS’ CIRCULAR-KEYSTONE, May 1991,
at 28.
79. Nick Ravo, Upscale Down-and-Outers Try Pawning, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1991, at
C1.
80. Patrice Apodaca, Recession Leaves Mark in Over-the-Counter Lending, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 22, 1991, at D3.
81. CASH AMERICA INTERNATIONAL, INC., 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1995).
82. Averil Guiste, Pawns in the Game of Commerce, TALL. DEM., Jan. 2, 1994, at C2.
83. Christie Brown, Pawnbrokers to the Stars, FORBES, July 8, 1991, at 104.
84. Wealthy Flock To Hock in Posh Pawnshop, HOUSTON BUS. J., Aug. 10, 1987, at 1.
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months—but the last guy they want to have know is their banker. They
don’t want him frightened.”85
The pledged goods are as diverse as the reasons for the loan. As
one roams the aisles of a pawnshop and gazes at the variety of arti-
cles, it takes little creativity to imagine the life stories represented
there. O.J. Simpson’s trophies from his years with the Buffalo Bills,86
oriental carpets,87 a gold bracelet owned by the pawnbroker’s wife,88 an
automobile trunk lid,89 and a Virginia country-cured ham90 are among the
many props for interesting stories about items that have been presented as
pawns.
V.   OVERVIEW OF FLORIDA PAWNSHOPS
It was recently estimated that Florida had 1270 pawnshops.91 In Janu-
ary 1996, the Florida counties with the highest number of pawnshop deal-
ers registered with the Florida Department of Revenue were Broward,
Pinellas, Hillsborough, Duval, and Palm Beach, with eighty-eight, sev-
enty, sixty-six, fifty-nine, and fifty respectively.92
                                                                                                         
85. Brayton, Upscale Clientele Targeted by Pawn Shop, NASHVILLE BUS. J., Sept. 26, 1988, at
16.
86. Dan Herbeck, 2 O.J. Trophies, Seized by Police; Focus of Dispute Pawnshop Wants
Them Back, BUFFALO NEWS, Feb. 2, 1995, at B1.
Two trophies won by O.J. Simpson during his early career with the Buffalo Bills
may remain in the possession of a Buffalo pawnshop that bought them last year, the
Buffalo News reported. A supreme court judge persuaded Buffalo police to return the
trophies to [the shop]. . . . However, [the judge] also barred the store from selling
the trophies for 60 days, giving Simpson’s attorney time to file suit to reclaim them .
. . .
Pawnshop Wins O.J. Trophies, TODAY’S PAWNBROKER, Fall 1995, at 42, 42.
87. Richard Weatherington, Pawnshop Keeps Oriental Carpets After Owner Loses Rights,
TODAY’S PAWNBROKER, Winter 1994, at 14.
88. A custom-made gold bracelet had been given to Mrs. Bridges by her pawnbroker
husband. The bracelet was stolen from a motel room in which she was staying. Later, when
the thief tried to pawn the bracelet, he had the misfortune to choose Mr. Bridges as his pawn-
broker. When questioned, the thief fled with Mr. Bridges in hot pursuit. After a considerable
run about town, the thief cleared a fence into a parking lot where “Bridges saw his friend
Crider and [shouted for his help]. Crider joined the chase and shortly caught the man . . . .
The thief may not have had a chance. Crider is a former marathon runner.” Crime News,
TODAY’S PAWNBROKER, Winter 1994, at 43, 60.
89. The pawnbroker at Jack’s Gun & Pawn Shop was curious about what a fellow in the
parking lot was doing to his own car. In a few minutes, the object of the curiosity came into
the shop to pawn the lid off the trunk of the very car he had driven to the shop. Media Watch,
TODAY’S PAWNBROKER, Summer 1994, at 36, 36.
90. "A Virginia Country Cured Ham was pawned [and] at the end of 60 days it was not
picked up so my employees and I enjoyed a very good lunch.” Under the Internal Revenue
Code, is this imputed income? Pawn Humor, FLA. PAWNBROKER, Summer 1995, at 33, 33.
91. CASKEY, supra note 4, at 41.
92. As of January 16, 1996, the State of Florida had 828 pawnshop dealers actively regis-
tered with the Department of Revenue. This number does not account for the total number of
pawnshops operating in Florida; it includes only the pawnshop dealers registered with the De-
partment of Revenue. See STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE SALES TAX
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Since 1985, Florida pawnshops have enjoyed a steady and, in some
years, impressive increase in gross sales.93 The sales revenue generated
through pawnshops provided Florida with a total of $5,116,002 in state
sales taxes and local option taxes just for calendar year 1994.94 From 1990
through 1994, the total amount was $18,824,948.95
The viability and resulting number of pawnshops in a particular state is
directly related to economic factors such as interest rates, pawnshop op-
erating costs, and the regulations governing pawnbrokers in that state.96
The economic growth of the Florida pawn industry, as illustrated by the
sales tax base of the pawnbroking industry, can be attributed, in part, to
the nature of Florida’s state pawnbroking regulations.97
VI.   GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF FLORIDA PAWNBROKING
A.   An Historical Perspective
The United States has never had either nationally operated pawnshops
or national regulation of pawnbrokers. It was not until the early 1880s
                                                                                                         
REGISTRATION DATA (Jan. 16, 1996) (department computer printout on file with author)
(listing the active pawn shop dealers registered in Florida).
93. The Department of Revenue collects only sales figures because, in their role as col-
lector of the state sales tax, loans are of little or no interest.
The following table lists the gross sales by fiscal year and is based on yearly statistics for
Florida Department of Revenue (DOR) sales tax return data on DOR-administered taxes/DOR
accounts.
TABLE I
Gross Sales for State of Florida Pawnshops
Fiscal Year Gross Sales
1995 $113,528,275 [through Oct. 9, 1995]
1994   107,669,725
1993     90,634,773
1992     75,900,229
1991     66,596,080
1990     66,004,549
1989     65,112,456
1988     56,781,116
1987     43,752,702
1986     35,083,086
1985     29,235,105
Id.
94. State of Florida, DOR-validated tax receipts data on DOR-administered taxes/DOR accounts.
Id.
95. Id. The complete data for 1995 was available only for sales through October 9, 1995.
As of October 9, total 1995 sales and use tax collections already exceeded the entire twelve
months of 1994. Id.
96. Steiner & Strischek, supra note 2, at 45; see Oeltjen, Parade, supra note 9, at 761-
67; Jarret C. Oeltjen, Usury: Utilitarian or Useless?, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 167, 214 (1975)
(discussing the question “Who is protected by the rate ceilings?”) [hereinafter Oeltjen, Usury].
97. And, if Professor Caskey’s regression analysis is correct, to the relative poverty and
lack of education of my fellow Floridians. CASKEY, supra note 4, at 50.
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that the first state legislation specifically regulating pawnbrokers was en-
acted.98
Pawnbroking has a rather lengthy legislative history in Florida. The
common thread running through the myriad of  pawnshop regulations is
nonimpedence of the conduct of pawnshop businesses. This is especially
apparent when Florida pawnbrokers are compared to other Florida lend-
ers.99 Early Florida legislation focused on registration, crime prevention,
and the raising of revenue.100 These statutes mandated state licensure
(merely registration) and established procedures for documenting pawn
transactions to assist law enforcement officials in tracing stolen prop-
erty.101 This regulatory focus remains unchanged. Current statutory pro-
visions still regulate pawnbrokers little beyond the extent necessary to
assist law enforcement in recovering stolen property and in solving other
theft-related crimes.102 Florida has never had legislation expressly limiting
interest rates or other charges on pawn transactions. In contrast to many
other states and the District of Columbia,103 Florida does not impose eco-
nomically significant state licensing requirements104 on operating pawn-
shops.105
To date, the Florida Legislature has allowed pawnshops to operate
without intrusive and burdening restrictions and has thereby helped foster
the economic growth of this important—yet still questioned and ma-
ligned—business.106 Recently, however, some federal and Florida court
decisions, industry innovations and expansion, and local regulations have
somewhat unsettled placid waters. Perhaps the time for the Florida Legis-
lature to consider a comprehensive regulatory scheme has arrived.
At the time Florida adopted the common law of England, the common
law included regulations that required pawnbrokers both to record the
identity of the goods pledged, the amount loaned, and the name and ad-
dress of the pledgor and also to give the pledgor a copy of the record.107
                                                                                                         
98. See Oeltjen, Parade, supra note 9, at 759.
99. See infra notes 141-60.
100. See infra notes 108-10.
101. See infra notes 108-10.
102. See infra notes 119-26.
103. E.g., District of Columbia (minimum capital, “convenience and advantage”), Penn-
sylvania (“convenience and advantage,” both state and local licenses), Vermont (“convenience
and advantage”). Jarret C. Oeltjen, Pawnbroking: Coming to America, Observations of Statu-
tory Non-Uniformity and a Call for Uniform Legislation, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 223, 233-87 (1990)
[hereinafter Oeltjen, America].
104. Section 538.17, Florida Statutes, expressly authorizes local regulation that does in-
clude licensing. FLA. STAT. § 538.17 (1995).
105. Florida has not required a state pawnbroker’s occupational license since 1971. See id.
§ 205.434; 1972, Fla. Laws ch. 72-306, § 1, at 1142 (repealing FLA. STAT. § 205.434
(1971)).
106. Pawnbrokers are sure to identify with the memorable words of comedian Rodney
Dangerfield, “I don’t get no respect."
107. Ch. 24, Laws of Eng. (1757).
1012 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:995
The first Florida statute specifically addressing pawnbrokers was
chapter 5106, Laws of Florida, enacted in 1903.108 It appears to have been
modeled after the common law. The statute required pawnbrokers to keep
“a complete and true record of all their transactions” and to make these
records available for inspection by law enforcement personnel.109 Each
pawnbroker was required to pay a license tax of $100 to the state for each
place of business.110 A penalty of one to six months’ imprisonment was
imposed for violation of the law.111
In 1913, the Legislature increased the license fee to $150 for those
pawnbrokers in cities with populations of 10,000 or more. The record-
keeping requirements for all pawnbrokers were amended to require data
“showing from whom each article of their stock was purchased and the
date of purchase, and the date and to whom each article was sold.”112
In 1941, the 1913 provisions, with minor changes in the amount and
structure of the licensure requirements, were recodified under the chapter
regulating license taxes.113
In 1957, the Florida Legislature enacted legislation that expressly gave
the pawnbroker the right to sell the pawn if no principal or interest were
paid within six months of the pledge; the sale terminated all liability of
the pawnbroker to the pledgor, and all rights and interests of both the
pawnbroker and pledgor vested in the purchaser at sale.114 These provi-
sions, which had to be printed on the pawn ticket, constituted notice of
intent to sell and consent by the pledgor.115 No penalty was created for
violation of this statute.
In 1959, the Legislature imposed on the pawnbroker an affirmative
duty to make monthly reports to the local sheriff of all pawn transactions
recorded pursuant to statute.116
In 1971, the statute was slightly modified to reflect a change in crimi-
nal penalties for violation of the licensure statute.117 Also, under a larceny
                                                                                                         
108. FLA. S. COMM. ON COM., 1984-85 INTERIM REPORT: REVIEW OF PAWNBROKING IN
FLORIDA TO DETERMINE IF THE TRANSACTION SHOULD BE REGULATED AS AN “INTEREST”
OR “BUY-BACK” TRANSACTION 11 (1985) (on file with comm.).
109. 1903, Fla. Laws ch. 5106, § 34, at 13.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. 1913, Fla. Laws ch. 6424, § 42, at 40.
113. FLA. STAT. § 205.51 (1941).
114. FLA. STAT. § 715.04 (1957) (repealed 1989). In a number of jurisdictions (e.g., Indi-
ana, Maine, Massachusetts, and  Michigan), the pawnbroker is required to sell the pawn and
apply the proceeds to the loan and service charges. Any surplus must be returned to the debtor.
See Oeltjen, America, supra note 103, at 233-87.
115. FLA. STAT. § 715.04 (1957) (repealed 1989).
116. FLA. STAT. § 205.511 (1959). Section 205.51, Florida Statutes, required the pawn-
broker to “keep a complete and true record of all transactions, showing from whom each arti-
cle of stock was purchased, the date of purchase, and the date and to whom each article was
sold.” In 1967, sections 205.51 and 205.511 were repealed and recodified with minor changes
as sections 205.434 and 205.442, Florida Statutes.
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statute, pawnbrokers were required to keep records of all merchandise
bought and sold and to make these records available to law enforcement
personnel.118
The state licensure provisions underwent major surgery in 1972 when
most of the occupational licensing sections were repealed.119 State licensure
of many businesses was abolished and local governments were granted the
authority to issue occupational licenses.120 The language specifically regu-
lating pawnbrokers was repealed, including the requirements to keep
transaction records and to report these to local sheriffs. This revision,
when coupled with the deletion of pawnbrokers from the larceny statute in
1975,121 meant that by the end of 1975, the only Florida statute governing
pawnbrokers controlled the redemption period and sale of the pawn.122
There were no licensing or record-keeping requirements, nor were there
any penalties for violation of the remaining redemption/sale provisions.
In 1979, the void was partially filled with legislative reinstatement of
the record-keeping requirements.123 The required records had to be avail-
able to police personnel upon request.124 The statute articulated that a law-
ful owner of stolen property, upon furnishing proof of ownership, was
entitled to recover that property through police processes125 at no personal
expense (that is, without either judicial process or reimbursement of the
                                                                                                         
117. FLA. STAT. § 205.434 (1967).
118. FLA. STAT. § 811.165 (1971). In Newman v. Carlson, 280 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1973),
these record-keeping requirements survived a constitutional challenge. The court held that it
was not a violation of the equal protection clause to require persons or firms regularly buying
and selling junk or secondhand goods to keep records. It was a valid exercise of the state’s po-
lice power. “The act before us which indeed frustrates the sale of stolen merchandise and
greatly enhances the possibility of return of these items to their rightful owners is in the inter-
est of public welfare and strikes at the basic evil of disposal by sale of illegally obtained mer-
chandise.” Id. at 428-29.
This statute was substantially rewritten in 1975 and all references to pawnbrokers were de-
leted. 1975, Fla. Laws ch. 75-118 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 812.049, .051 (1975)).
119. Local Occupational License Tax Act, ch. 72-306, § 1, at 1142, Laws of Fla. (codified
at FLA. STAT. §§ 205.013-.062 (1972)).
120. As discussed infra in part IX, this grant of authority to local regulators is, at best,
problematic.
121. 1975, Fla. Laws ch. 75-298, § 28, at 1092 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 812.051
(1975)).
122. FLA. STAT. § 715.04 (1975).
123. FLA. STAT. § 715.041 (1979). This statute required pawnbrokers to demand identifi-
cation from the pledgor, record the identity of the pledgor, record the transaction date, and
have the pledgor sign the record. Id.
124. Note that under the laws repealed in 1972, the pawnbroker had the duty not only to
keep records but to also to make periodic reports to the sheriff. FLA. STAT. §§ 205.434-.442
(1971) (repealed by 1972, Fla. Laws ch. 72-306, § 1, at 1142).
125. For a discussion of problems created by such police procedures, see discussion infra part
XI.
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pawnbroker for the loan), unless the pawnbroker could produce evidence
that the pledgor had provided proof of ownership of the pawn.126
Currently, Florida pawnbroking is governed by chapter 538, as en-
acted in 1989. The main impetus behind the law was to confront the
problem of property theft and drug-related crimes by facilitating recovery
of stolen goods and apprehending those criminals who may turn to sec-
ondhand dealers for cash.127 Due to requests by the Florida Law Enforce-
ment Recovery Unit, this comprehensive statute was enacted to group
pawnbrokers and others under the category of “second-hand dealers” and
to repeal all extant statutes relating to pawnbrokers, precious metals deal-
ers, and junk dealers.128 By carefully examining the operative terms and
their definitions, one could probably construct an interesting example of
effective lobbying and legislative negotiation and compromise.
The statute applies to “transactions,” which means “any purchase,
consignment, or pawn of secondhand goods by a secondhand dealer.”129
“Secondhand dealer” is then defined as including all those “engaged in
the business of purchasing, consigning, or pawning secondhand goods or
entering into title loan transactions,” including “pawnbrokers, jewelers,
precious metals dealers, garage sale operators, secondhand stores, and
consignment shops.”130 This broad definition is subject to numerous ex-
                                                                                                         
126. FLA. STAT. § 715.041(2) (1979). For a discussion of recovery of “stolen” property
from pawnbrokers and their customers, see text infra part XI.
127. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Crim. Just., SB 16-B (1989) Staff Analysis 6 (final June 22,
1989) (on file with Comm.).
Not surprisingly, the information customers provide pawnbrokers is being used by authori-
ties who have access to it for law enforcement purposes other than the recovery of stolen prop-
erty (such as collecting unpaid parking or traffic tickets). Some pawnbrokers express fear that
such practices may make some people reluctant to patronize pawnbrokers. On Top of Many Is-
sues, TODAY’S PAWNBROKER, Spring 1994, at 48, 48.
128. 1989, Fla. Laws ch. 533 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 538.03-.26 (1989)).
129. FLA. STAT. § 538.03(1)(h) (1995).
130. Id. § 538.03(1)(a) (emphasis added). The italicized language was added to the statute
during the 1995 legislative session. 1995, Fla. Laws ch. 95-287, § 1, at 2697 (codified at FLA.
STAT. §§ 538.03, .06, .15, .16 (1995)).
1996]                    FLORIDA PAWNBROKING 1015
clusions.131 One of the exclusions, flea markets, was the subject of an un-
successful constitutional challenge.132
“Pawnbroker” is then defined as “any person, corporation, or other
business organization or entity which is regularly engaged in the business
of making pawns, but does not include a financial institution as defined
[by statute] or any person who regularly loans money or any other thing
of value on stocks, bonds, or other securities.”133 A “pawn” transaction
can be either a “[l]oan of money . . . [with a] bailment of personal prop-
erty as security”134 or a “[b]uy-sell agreement . . . whereby a purchaser
agrees to hold property for a specified period of time to allow the seller
the exclusive right to repurchase the property.”135 When the statute ex-
plicitly states that “[a] buy-sell agreement is not a loan of money,”136 the
not-so-hidden intent is that a transaction so designed should not be subject
to the usury statute.137
The “new” statute, covering specified secondhand sales, secondhand
dealers, and secondary metal recyclers, first became effective October 2,
1989,138 and has been amended in each legislative session since its crea-
tion.139 Although most of the subsequent amendments were minor clarifi-
                                                                                                         
131. Among the exclusions: “an organization or entity registered with the state as a non-
profit, religious, or charitable organization or any school-sponsored association or organiza-
tion,” “a law enforcement officer acting in an official capacity,” “any garage sale operator
who holds garage sales less than ten weekends per year,” “any person at antique, coin, or col-
lectible shows or sales,” “any person purchasing, consigning, or pawning secondhand goods at
a flea market regardless of whether at a temporary or permanent business location at the flea
market,” “any auction business . . . unless the business deals in secondhand goods,” “any per-
son purchasing, consigning, or pawning secondhand goods ordered by mail, computer-assisted
shopping, media-assisted, media-facilitated, or media-solicited shopping or shopping by other
means of media communication, including, but not limited to, direct mail advertising, unsolic-
ited distribution of catalogues, television, radio, or other electronic media, telephone, maga-
zine, or newspaper advertising, so long as such person is in this state at the time of the order,”
“a motor vehicle dealer.” FLA. STAT. § 538.03(2) (1995).
132. State v. Hodges, 614 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). The court held both that the
term “flea market” did not render the statute unconstitutionally vague and that the exclusion
of flea markets from record-keeping requirements imposed upon other dealers in second-
hand goods did not violate equal protection. “[I]t would be more difficult to conduct illicit
activities [at a flea market than at a] sole proprietorship or business with only one vendor .
. . .” Id. at 655.
133. FLA. STAT. § 538.03(1)(c) (1995).
134. Id. § 538.03(1)(d)1.
135. Id. § 538.03(1)(d)2. For a discussion of this distinction, see infra part VII.
136. FLA. STAT. § 538.03(1)(d) (1995).
137. Section 687.02, Florida Statutes, defines “usurious contracts” as “[a]ll contracts for
the payment of interest upon any loan, advance of money, line of credit, or forbearance to en-
force the collection of any debt, or upon any obligation whatever, at a higher rate of interest
than the equivalent of 18 percent per annum simple interest . . . .” Id. § 687.02; see also
PRACTICE UNDER FLORIDA USURY LAW § 1.11 (2d ed. 1993) [hereinafter FLORIDA USURY
LAW].
138. 1989, Fla. Laws ch. 89-533, § 6, at 2739 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 538.03-.26 (1989)).
139. See chs. 90-192, 90-318, 91-429, 92-79, 92-303, 93-37, 93-97, 94-353, 95-287, Laws of
Fla.
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cations,140 some notable additions to chapter 538 have been enacted. One
amendment made explicit the requirement that a secondhand dealer main-
tain actual physical possession of all secondhand goods throughout a
transaction; title or any other form of security in secondhand goods could
not be accepted in lieu of actual physical possession.141 This blow to the
title pawn (loan) industry was unsuccessfully challenged in the Florida
Legislature in both 1993 and 1994.142 In 1995, title loans were explicitly
authorized, but the legislation divorced the “new” title loan industry from
that of the pawnshops.143
Another statutory addition provided that if a secondhand dealer con-
tests the identification or ownership claims of particular property in pos-
session of the dealer, the person alleging ownership may bring an action
for replevin in the county or circuit court.144 A universally common pro-
vision in pawnbroker regulation schemes145 (omitted from the original
                                                                                                         
140. For example, “pawnbroker” was redefined from “a secondhand dealer who is regu-
larly engaged in the business of making pawns . . . [,]” FLA. STAT. § 538.03(1)(c) (1989), to
“any person, corporation, or other business organization or entity which is regularly engaged
in the business of making pawns . . . .” FLA. STAT. § 538.03(1)(c) (1995). The definition was
altered even though a “secondhand dealer” was already defined as “any person, corporation,
or other business organization or entity . . . .” FLA. STAT. § 538.03(1)(a) (1989).
The supplemental changes have maintained the same holding periods and inspection of rec-
ords and premises procedures. The amendments to these sections clarified which items were
subject to the holding periods and the jurisdiction of the inspecting law enforcement office.
Compare FLA. STAT. § 538.05, .06 (1995) with id. § 538.05, .06.
141. FLA. STAT. § 538.06 (1993). This amendment was designed to eliminate the practice of
pawning automobile titles for cash, a practice by which the possession of the auto remained in the
seller/debtor, as contrasted with the procedures of the conventional pawn in which part of the es-
sence of the transaction was to surrender possession of the subject tangible property to the pawn-
broker. See supra notes 52-72, infra notes 201-08 and accompanying text for additional informa-
tion on the title loan industry.
142. Earlier legislative attempts to authorize title loans were unsuccessful. In 1993, instead
of authorizing title loans as lobbied, language was added to chapter 538 to prohibit title loans.
1993, Fla. Laws ch. 93-97, § 3, at 514 (codified at  FLA. STAT. § 538.06 (1993)); see Ericks,
1994 Legislative Update, FLA. PAWNBROKER, Summer 1994, at 9. In 1994, a title loan
authorization bill passed both the Florida Senate and Florida House of Representatives without op-
position, only to be vetoed by the Governor. Veto of Fla. SB 2208 (1994) (letter from Gov. Chiles
to Sec’y of State Jim Smith, May 26, 1994) (on file with Sec’y of State, The Capitol, Tallahassee,
Fla.).
143. 1995, Fla. Laws ch. 95-287, § 3, at 2698 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 538.15 (1995)
(title lenders may not use pawn terminology)).
144. FLA. STAT. § 538.08 (1995). As a prerequisite to this right of replevin, the statute
requires that the person alleging ownership file a timely report of the theft of the goods to the
proper authorities. Id. The following is part of the suggested form complaint included in the
statute: “3. Plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the property under a security agreement
dated _____, 19____, a copy of which is attached.” Id. The use of this provision suggests that
the statute was enacted to protect lending institutions when debtors pawn goods covered by a
security agreement and not necessarily when the original owner of the goods was relieved of
possession by a thief.
145. See the survey of pawnbroker laws in Oeltjen, America, supra note 103, at 233-87.
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1989 enactment but added in 1990)146 is the statutory provision that man-
dates the minimum length of time that a pawnbroker must keep a pawned
article before selling it.147 The cutoff time distinguishes between a pawn
that is “a loan of money” and a pawn that is “a buy-sell agreement.”148 If
the pawn is a loan of money and the property has not been redeemed or
there has been no payment on the account for a period of ninety days, the
pawn is subject to sale or disposal.149 However, a pawn that is a buy-sell
agreement is subject to sale or disposal in a shorter period of time, when
the property has not been repurchased from the pawnbroker or there has
been no payment on the account within sixty days.150
The current chapter includes requirements for registration,151 record
keeping,152 delivering copies of the records to law enforcement authori-
                                                                                                         
146. 1990, Fla. Laws ch. 90-192, § 4, at 865 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 215.475 (1990)
(amended by 1991, Fla. Laws ch. 91-429, § 4(2)(a), at 93-97).
147. FLA. STAT. § 538.16 (1995).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. This section also requires that every pawn ticket and receipt for a pawn have
printed on it notice of these provisions. The ticket and receipt must also include notice of
sale or disposal, notice of intention to sell or dispose without further notice, and consent to
sale or disposal. All liability of the pawnbroker terminates with such sale or disposal and
vests in the purchaser the right, title, and interest of the seller or borrower and the pawn-
broker. Id.
151. Id. § 538.09. Interestingly, registration is not with a department that regulates bank-
ing, finance, or secured transactions but rather is with the Florida Department of Revenue. For
registration purposes, a secondhand dealer must now pay the Department of Revenue a nomi-
nal fee per location and an annual renewal fee, in addition to the initial application fee. Id.
In contrast, section 5-19A-11(a) of the Alabama Pawnshop Act requires that pawnbrokers
obtain initial licenses at a cost of $100 for each location and then pay additional annual renewal
fees of $100 per license. 1995 Ala. Acts ch. 19A, § 5-19A-11(a). Furthermore, pawnbrokers
must pay a license tax of $250 for each place of business and an additional tax if they sell pis-
tols, sawed-off shotguns, or revolvers. 1995 Ala. Acts ch. 12, art. 2, § 40-12-138; see also
Oeltjen, America, supra note 103, at 238-87 (comparing licensing (registration) fees charged in
the various jurisdictions).
In order to register, a “secondhand dealer” must 1) be a natural person who has reached the
age of 18 years; 2) submit a fee; and 3) furnish a certified, complete set of fingerprints and a
“recent fullface photographic identification card of himself.” FLA. STAT. § 538.09(1), (2)
(1995). Registration may be denied (or revoked, suspended, or restricted) if the registrant has
1) violated chapter 538 or any rule or order thereunder; 2) made a material false statement in
the registration application; 3) been guilty of a fraudulent act relating to any purchase or sale;
4) made a misrepresentation or false statement to, or concealed any material fact from, any
purchaser or seller; 5) made purchases or sales through any nonregistered associate; 6) within
the preceding five years been convicted of, or entered a nolo plea regarding, statutorily enu-
merated property offenses, felony drug offenses, or any fraudulent or dishonest dealing; 7) had
a final judgment rendered against him or her in a civil action upon grounds of fraud, embez-
zlement, misrepresentation, or deceit; or 8) has failed to pay any owed Florida sales tax. Id. §
538.09(5).
152. Id. § 538.04. This section requires pawnbrokers to maintain records of all transactions
on the premises and deliver the records of any acquisition of secondhand goods to local law en-
forcement within 24 hours of acquisition. The record is to contain (a) the time, date, and place of
the transaction; (b) a complete and accurate description of the goods acquired; (c) a description of
the person from whom the goods were acquired (including full name, address, workplace, home
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ties,153 goods holding periods,154 and inspection by the authorities.155 The
chapter also includes a listing of prohibited business practices;156 proce-
dures for the return of stolen goods to the rightful owner and for restitu-
tion to the secondhand dealer by the convicted thief;157 penalties for viola-
tion of the Act;158 explicit permission for local governments to enact ordi-
nances governing the operation of pawnshops;159 but no mandate regarding
service charges, interest rates, or sale/purchase differential or similar
charges. Yet, pawn transactions involving loans can still be subject to the
maximum interest rates specified under Florida’s usury statute, as well as
other statutes.160
Various historical schemes illustrate the unique regulatory treatment
afforded pawnbrokers. Still, pawnbrokers are heavily regulated, but many
of these regulations are not strictly adhered to by the industry, in most in-
stances because of a misunderstanding of the regulation or its applicabil-
ity.161
                                                                                                         
and work phone numbers, height, weight, date of birth, race, gender, hair color, eye color, and any
other identifying marks), and (d) any other information required by the form approved by the De-
partment of Law Enforcement. The “transaction records” must be maintained for five years. Id. §
538.06(4).
153. Id. § 538.04(1).
154. Id. § 538.06. The statutory holding period to be observed by “secondhand dealers” is
15 days unless the goods are being pawned. Id. § 538.06(1). This holding period may be
“extended to 60 days by a law enforcement officer upon probable cause that the goods are sto-
len and that further holding is necessary . . . . A court of competent jurisdiction may extend
the holding period even further.” Id. § 538.06(3).
155. Id. § 538.05 (“The premises and required records . . . are subject to inspection during
regular business hours . . . by any state law enforcement officer who [has] jurisdiction over the
dealer.”).
156. Id. § 538.15 (listing forbidden acts including failure to pay sales tax or have a sales
tax registration number; knowingly transacting business with a minor, someone under the in-
fluence of alcohol or other drugs, or someone using an alias; or transacting business between
10 p.m. and 8 am. or at a “drive-through window”).
157. Id. §§ 538.08, .07(2).
158. "[A] person who knowingly violates any provision of this chapter commits a misde-
meanor of the first degree, punishable [by imprisonment not exceeding one year] and by a fine
not to exceed $10,000.” Id. § 538.07(1).
For each violation of the registration requirements, the Department of Revenue may impose
a civil fine up to $10,000. If the fine is not paid within 60 days, the Department may bring a
civil action under section 120.69, Florida Statutes, to recover the fine. Id. § 538.09(4).
159. Id. § 538.17. As will be discussed infra, multilevel regulation schemes are, at best,
problematic. See also Association in Membership Push, TODAY’S PAWNBROKER, Spring 1994,
at 48, 48 (The Maryland Pawnbrokers “[A]ssociation is considering backing new state legisla-
tion to standardize the situation and eliminate the necessity of dealing with myriad laws from
different strata of government.”).
160. See infra notes 171-200 and accompanying text (discussing recent Florida case law
addressing this issue).
161. See, e.g., Ron Stempkowski, Old Law Is New to Many Pawnbrokers, TODAY’S
PAWNBROKER, Summer 1995, at 9, 9 (discussing Truth-in-Lending and its applicability to
pawnbrokers); Richard Weatherington, New Money Laundering Law Affects Some Pawnbro-
kers, TODAY’S PAWNBROKER, Summer 1995, at 16, 16 (stating that check-cashing and money
transmission services may well bring pawnbrokers within the scope of the Money Laundering
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B.   Pawnbrokers, Here Comes the Judge
Over the years, a limited number of cases involving pawnbrokers and
the provisions and decisions that regulate them have found their way into
the Florida supreme and other appellate courts. Some cases constitution-
ally challenged the statutes for vagueness of terms such as “junk or sec-
ondhand goods” and “flea markets.”162 Other constitutional challengers
unsuccessfully claimed that the regulation of certain types of dealers
without regulation of others was a denial of equal protection.163 However,
the Florida Supreme Court has held that “the law-making authority may,
under its police power, enact regulations that are not all-embracing. It may
legislate with reference to degrees of evil and to situations in which the evil
is demonstrably more harmful, without denying equal protection of the
law.”164
In at least one decision, a Florida pawnbroker successfully invoked
constitutional protection. In City of Miami Beach v. Mr. Samuel’s, Inc.,165
the Florida Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
finding that refusal to issue a pawnbroker license was arbitrary, unreason-
able, and unjust.166 Mr. Samuel’s, Inc. applied for a license in a C-4 zone,
which was a “highly concentrated business core.”167 The City argued that
because the ordinance did not expressly name pawnbrokers as a lawful
business in that zone, denial was justified.168 The court rejected this argu-
ment on the ground that a fair reading of the ordinance, with respect to
the businesses enumerated, showed that C-4 was a clearly applicable zone
contemplating businesses such as Mr. Samuel’s, Inc.169 The City, there-
                                                                                                         
Suppression Act of 1994); Richard Weatherington, Broker Loses Truck for Violating Pawnbro-
kers Act, UCC, TODAY’S PAWNBROKER, Summer 1995, at 22, 45 (“While most brokers gen-
erally understand their state’s pawn laws, other laws like the UCC, truth-in-lending and bank-
ruptcy can get very complicated.”); Beware the Dangers of Truth in Lending, NAT’L
PAWNBROKER, Summer 1995, at 32, 32 (“[T]he courts have consistently ruled that Truth in
Lending applies to pawn shops and failure to comply with its requirements could cost you your
business.”).
162. A statute that requires certain people or firms to keep records regularly, when they
buy and sell junk or secondhand goods, was found not to be vague and ambiguous. See New-
man v. Carson, 280 So. 2d 426, 426 (1973). The term “flea market,” as an exception to
statutory reporting requirements, was held not to render the statute unconstitutionally vague.
See State v. Hodges, 614 So. 2d 653, 653 (1993).
163. Record-keeping requirements statutorily imposed on those who regularly buy and sell
junk and secondhand goods but not on other retail merchants was found not to violate equal
protection requirements in Newman. 280 So. 2d at 426. Nor does excluding “flea markets”
from such requirements violate equal protection requirements. Hodges, 614 So. 2d at 653.
164. Newman, 280 So. 2d at 429.
165. 334 So. 2d 47, 47 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).
166. Id. at 48.
167. Id. at 47.
168. The City argued that because pawnshops were not specifically mentioned in the ordi-
nance, it had discretion as to where to put them. Id. at 48. This contention suspiciously smacks
of a perpetuation of the stigma discussed within part III of this Article.
169. City of Miami Beach, 334 So. 2d at 48.
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fore, upon receiving a valid application, had a clear legal duty to issue the
pawnbroker’s license.170
While precedent regarding pawnbrokers in Florida is comparatively
sparse, the appellate courts in the First and Second Districts have recently
decided cases that could greatly impact pawnbrokers in the future. In
June, 1992, the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed a lower court
decision finding that the pawn involved in a particular transaction was a
“sale” and not a “loan.”171 The appellate court found that under Florida
law,172 the ninety-day statutory period after which a pawnbroker may sell
or dispose of a pawned item applies to a “loan” from the pawnbroker to
the customer, and the sixty-day statutory period applies to a customer-to-
pawnbroker “sale” in which the customer retains the right to repurchase
the item.173 Because the pawn ticket referred to a “Buy-Back” and also
listed the amount that the customer had to pay to get the ring back as the
“Repurchase Price,” the court found that “competent substantial evi-
dence” existed from which the trial court could have determined that the
pawned ring involved a sale and had not been given as security for a
loan.174 In so holding, the court implicitly held that the usury statute and
its limit on interest did not apply.175
Additionally, both the First and Second District Courts of Appeal have
recently highlighted the extent of regulation of Florida pawnbrokers.
These cases focused on pawnbroker regulation with respect to two differ-
ent questions: 1) whether the Department of Agriculture’s Division of
Consumer Services has jurisdiction to sue pawnshops/pawnbrokers or
move for injunctive action for alleged statutory violations, and 2) what
statutory restrictions, other than chapter 538, may apply to pawnbro-
kers.176
In Quick Cash of Clearwater, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture &
Consumer Services.,177 the Second District Court of Appeal held that the
Legislature had given the Division of Consumer Services authority to seek
an injunction, on three days notice, against the pawnbroker’s alleged vio-
lation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act
(DUTA).178 The Division argued that its authority went beyond the bounds
                                                                                                         
170. Id.
171. See Isaac v. Brave, 600 So. 2d 1258, 1259 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
172. FLA. STAT. § 538.16(1) (1991).
173. Issac, 600 So. 2d at 1259-60. Much of the confusion in interpreting this provision
was eliminated by the 1993 legislative amendments, which added clarifying language to section
538.16, Florida Statutes. See FLA. STAT. § 538.16 (1995).
174. Issac, 600 So. 2d at 1259.
175. See FLA. STAT. § 687.02 (1991).
176. See infra notes 177-200 and accompanying text.
177. 605 So. 2d 898, 901 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
178. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 501.201 (1995)). Subsection 570.544 (11), Florida Statutes,
created by chapter 90-323, Laws of Florida, states the following:
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of the DUTA and that, “if read literally, the statute might allow the Divi-
sion to seek an emergency injunction whenever the Division ‘has reason
to believe . . . that the interests of the consumers of this state . . . are
being damaged . . . .’”179 Since the court found that the alleged violations
came within DUTA, it never reached the expansive jurisdiction ques-
tion.180 In dicta, however, the court expressed doubt as to whether the
Florida Legislature had intended to grant the Division such an “expansive
grant of authority.”181
The court carefully pointed out that its determination applied merely to
the issue of whether the Division has authority to file an action to enjoin
violations of DUTA and not to the issue of “whether the transactions may
result in illegal usury or whether they are otherwise an appropriate subject
for criminal prosecution.”182 The court found that the particular pawn
agreement was a “loan of money”183 and subject to regulation under
chapter 538, it also found “nothing in [the debtor’s] agreements or in the
Florida Statutes that would exempt [the debtor’s] agreement from laws
regulating usury.”184 In dicta, the court remarked that some pawn agree-
ments, especially those structured as buy-sell agreements, may not be loans
subject to usury regulation.185 The court also was careful to emphasize that
the provisions of chapter 538, Florida Statutes, “are not a comprehensive
regulation of pawnbrokers.”186 Overall, the court noted, there is confusion
about which statutes are applicable in regulating pawnbrokers.187 The
                                                                                                         
If the division by its own inquiry, or as a result of complaints, has reason to believe
that a violation of the laws of the state relating to consumer protection has occurred
or is occurring, that the interests of the consumers of this state have been damaged
or are being damaged, or that the public health, safety, or welfare is endangered or
is likely to be endangered by any consumer product or service, the division may
commence legal proceedings in circuit court to enjoin the act or practices or the sale
of the product or service and may seek appropriate relief on behalf of the consumers.
Upon application by the division, a hearing shall be held within 3 days after the
commencement of the proceedings.
FLA. STAT. § 570.544 (11) (1990) (emphasis added).
179. Quick Cash of Clearwater, Inc., 605 So. 2d at 901.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 900.
183. Id. at 902 (citing FLA. STAT. § 538.03(1)(d)1 (1991)).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. For example, the court noted that chapter 516, Florida Statutes, regulates consumer
finance, yet it does not apply to “any bona fide pawnbroking business transacted under a
pawnbroker’s license.” Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 516.02(4) (1991)). The court went on to
question what the Legislature meant by this phrase since chapter 538 is only a registration
statute, and the State of Florida does not otherwise provide for issuance of pawnbrokers’ li-
censes. Id. at 902 n.4.
The court’s confusion was compounded because the case involved the attempted pawn and
leaseback of an automobile. Id. at 901-02. Automobiles were not included within the extensive
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court then encouraged “the legislature, at its earliest opportunity, to re-
view . . . its overall regulation of both buy-sell agreements and loan
transactions by pawnbrokers.”188
The court did hold that if the Division could prove that Quick Cash
unlawfully conducted business as a consumer finance company or that
Quick Cash engaged in a business method violative of criminal usury
regulations, the Division could establish either an “unfair method of com-
petition” or an “unfair or deceptive act” under the DUTA.189 The trial
court could then properly enjoin further violation.190
In Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services v. Quick Cash of
Tallahassee, Inc.,191 decided only a little over three months later by the
First District Court of Appeal, the scope of the Division’s jurisdiction was
again addressed.192 At the trial level, “[b]ecause the Division had con-
ceded that ‘the instant case does not involve [c]hapter 501,’ the trial court
. . . granted Quick Cash’s motion for summary judgment.”193 The First
District reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case.194 With-
out the hesitation expressed by the Second District, the court found that
the Division had standing to bring an action for injunctive relief and dam-
ages based on alleged violations of state usury laws, pawnbroker laws,
consumer finance laws, motor vehicle retail sales finance laws, and motor
vehicle sales laws, and that the Division was not limited to claims of un-
fair and deceptive trade practices.195 In holding that the Division had juris-
diction, the court focused on the plain meaning of the words of the relevant
statute and found them to be “clear and unambiguous.”196 The court con-
cluded that the Legislature intended to empower the Division “to act as
the protector of consumer interests” and “to sue on behalf of the state’s
consumers.”197 The court expressed no opinion as to the constitutionality
of the legislative delegation because an issue had not been raised in the
trial court.198
The court cautioned that its decision could lead to future disputes over
whether the Division or some other department of the executive branch
                                                                                                         
listing of types of property subject to chapter 538 regulation. Id. at 902; see also FLA. STAT. §
538.03(1)(g) (1991).
188. Quick Cash of Clearwater, Inc., 605 So. 2d at 902-03.
189. Id. at 902. As yet, the Department of Agriculture has not proceeded in any further
litigation under either of these theories.
190. Id.
191. 609 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
192. Id. at 735.
193. Id. at 738.
194. Id. at 740.
195. Id. at 736, 740.
196. Id. at 738.
197. Id. (construing FLA. STAT. § 570.544(11) (1991)).
198. Id. at 735, 740.
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should handle a particular consumer complaint.199 Also, those parties
charged with violating laws somehow related to “consumer protection”
could be investigated and subjected to legal prosecution by more than one
governmental authority. The court concluded, “Whether what it has
passed is wise or not is for the legislature to decide.”200
As an epilogue, the underlying transactions in the two cases, the
pawning and leaseback of automobiles, no longer present the same type of
problem for the Division. By amending chapter 538 in 1993, the Legisla-
ture prohibited automobile pawn/leaseback transactions.201 An attempt in
the 1994 legislative session to legalize reinstatement of the practice was
rebuffed.202 However, during the 1995 legislative session, statutory
amendments approving “title loans” were enacted.203 The newly approved
lenders are specifically outlawed from engaging in the loan/leaseback type
of transaction challenged by the Department of Agriculture’s Division of
Consumer Services and expressly prohibited from using of the term
“pawn or pawnbroker” in title loan transactions.204 But title lenders are
accorded an all-inclusive twenty-two percent per month205 service
charge/interest ceiling for such loans even though the debtor is permitted
to retain possession of the automobile.206 To alert the borrower, title loan
“charges shall be fully disclosed, conspicuously in writing, and initialed by
the motor vehicle owner at the initiation of the transaction.”207 Consumer
complaints generated through the activities of the title loan industry con-
tinue to concern government regulators.208
VII.   LOAN VS. BUY-SELL AGREEMENTS: A PRIMER
Though the governing statute includes, within the definition of
"pawn," both buy-sell agreements and loans collateralized with pledges of
                                                                                                         
199. Id. at 739. The Second District Court had predicted that “there [would] be chronic
problems determining the authority of the Division and that of other departments of the execu-
tive branch unless section 570.544, Florida Statutes (1991), is clarified.” Quick Cash of
Clearwater, Inc. v. Department of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 605 So. 2d 898, 903 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1992).
200. Quick Cash of Tallahassee, Inc., 609 So. 2d at 739.
201. 1993, Fla. Laws ch. 93-97, § 3, at 514 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 538.06 (2), (3)
(1993)); see also supra note 134.
202. Veto of Fla. SB 2208 (1994) (letter from Gov. Chiles to Sec’y of State Jim Smith,
May 26, 1994) (on file with Sec’y of State, The Capitol, Tallahassee, Fla.); see also supra
note 135.
203. 1995, Fla. Laws ch. 95-287, § 1, at 2697 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 538.03(1)(a), (h),
(i) (1995)).
204. FLA. STAT. § 538.15(4), (5) (1995).
205. "No charges other than those charges permitted in paragraph (e) [the 22% per month]
shall be allowed . . . .” Id. § 538.06(5)(e), (f).
206. Id. § 538.06(5)(b), (e).
207. Id. § 538.06(5)(f).
208. See Gray, supra note 49, at H2.
1024 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:995
personal property,209 constructing the transaction to be one or the other
can have a multitude of legal consequences. As a general rule,210 the buy-
sell agreement would be the industry-favored characterization; any trans-
action that would be characterized as a loan would probably have resulted
from carelessness or misinformation. The main reasons to avoid
loan/pledge status for pawns are that a pawn loan is subject to the techni-
cal requirements and priorities set forth in chapter 679, Florida Statutes,
governing secured transactions;211 lenders (loan/pledge) fare less well in
bankruptcy;212 and the usury statute with its interest rate limitations ap-
plies to loans but not to true buy-sell agreements.213 In times past, further
justification for the buy-sell preference could be found in the belief that
buy-sell agreements were not subject to the federal Truth-in-Lending re-
quirements214 and in possible avoidance of the record-keeping and holding
period requirements imposed on pawn loans.
Using the buy-sell agreement method rather than a pawn loan, the
pawnbroker will purchase an item of personal property (the “pawn”) from
an individual seller (the “pawner”) through an agreement that gives the
seller the exclusive right to repurchase the item within a specified period
of time—a minimum of sixty days in Florida. The repurchase price is, of
course, higher than the original “sales” price, and a markup of twenty-
five percent is not unusual.215 But since this is a purchase and not a loan,
the state usury limits should not apply.216 There is some danger to the
pawnbroker that, in a court of law, this sales agreement may be held to be
                                                                                                         
209. FLA. STAT. § 538.03(1)(d) (1995).
210. One is hard-pressed even to think of a reasonable exception to the “general rule."
211. “‘Security interest’ means an interest in personal property . . . which secures pay-
ment . . . of an obligation.” FLA. STAT. § 671.201(37) (1995). Chapter 679 “applies . . . [t]o
any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security interest in per-
sonal property . . . including goods.” Id. § 679.102(1)(a).
212. E.g., compare In re Lopez, 163 B.R. 189 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1994) (stating that a
pawn transaction that is a secured transaction can be modified by a chapter 13 debtor’s plan)
with In re Jackson, 133 B.R. 541 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1991) (stating that when a period for
redemption has expired, neither the debt nor the property pawned can be a part of the debtor’s
chapter 13 plan).
213. FLA. STAT. § 687.03(1) (1995). The usury limit applies to “any loan, advance of
money, line of credit, forbearance to enforce the collection of any sum of money, or other ob-
ligation.” Id. Generally, a buy-sell agreement would not be regarded as a loan. See Oeltjen,
Usury, supra note 96, at 187-88; FLORIDA USURY LAW, supra note 137, §§ 1.14, 1.15; Quick
Cash of Clearwater, Inc. v. Department of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 605 So. 2d 898, 902
(Fla. 2d DCA 1992). Contra Mears v. Mayblum, 96 So. 2d 223, 226 (Fla. 1957) (stating that
a sale of property for cash plus a right to repurchase for some higher amount may be held to
be a loan).
214. See Oeltjen, Parade, supra note 9, at 767-69; see also Burnett v. Ala Mona Pawn
Shop, 3 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding pawn transactions subject to the Truth-in-Lending
Act); Chapes, Ltd. v. Anderson, 825 F.2d 357 (11th Cir. 1987) (discussing applicability of the
Truth-in-Lending Act to pawns).
215. Informal surveys have revealed rates of 25% for a 30-day transaction to be common
in Tallahassee and West Palm Beach.
216. FLA. STAT. § 687.02(1) (1995).
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a disguised loan.217 If found to be a loan, the magnitude of the “sales price
differential”218 may subject the pawnbroker to usury or other penalties.
Usually, the legal risk to the pawnbroker is minimal, both because of the
way the transaction is structured and also because those utilizing pawn-
broking services are concerned about maintaining their source for needed
funds. If pushed too far, however, the consumer may file a complaint; a
mounting number of complaints could prompt the Department of Agricul-
ture and Consumer Services to take action.
The historical use of buy-sell agreements to reduce the necessity for
record keeping and to avoid required holding periods is no longer an ef-
fective avenue; buy-sell agreements are now expressly included in the
definition of “pawn.”219 That definition makes it clear that buy-sell
agreements are pawn transactions subject to pawn and pawnbroker regu-
lations.
Under the Florida Uniform Commercial Code, if a pawn is a loan, it is
a secured transaction;220 the pawnbroker would have a security interest.221
The pawnbroker’s priority vis-à-vis others who have interests in the
pawned goods depends on the pawnbroker’s status as a secured lender. If
there were no special rules for pawn transactions that trumped the Code
provisions, under chapter 679, the parties could agree for the secured
party to forgo any deficiency there may be between the amount of the
loan with accrued service charges and the sales proceeds of the pawn.222
The parties, however, could not ignore, or otherwise waive,223 the notice
of sale required by chapter 679224 and the requirement that the debtor must
be paid any surplus generated by the sale of the pawn.225
The Code does resolve this issue; it states that the pawnbroker laws of
chapter 538 “are specifically not repealed and shall take precedence over
                                                                                                         
217. See supra notes 177-208 (discussing the Quick Cash cases); see also In re Held, 34
B.R. 151 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983), aff’d, 734 F.2d 628 (11th Cir. 1984).
218. This is the difference between the price received by the pawner/borrower and the
amount required to redeem the pawn.
219. FLA. STAT. § 538.03(1)(d) (1995).
220. Id. § 679.102.
221. Id. § 671.201(37) (defining “security interest” as “an interest in personal property . .
. which secures payment or performance of an obligation”). Even though it may be argued that
the pawner/debtor has no obligation because only the pledged good is at stake, there being no
personal liability, such argument should be rejected. The pawner/debtor has an equity of re-
demption that is being held by the pawnbroker, return being conditioned upon payment of an
agreed upon sum (loan plus service charges); to recover in equity, the debtor must first settle
this “obligation.” Furthermore, by reading the entire definition of “security interest,” it be-
comes obvious that “obligation” is used in a very broad sense (e.g., to include seller’s title re-
tention in a sales setting and the buyer’s interest in a purchase of accounts or chattel paper).
See id.
222. Id. § 679.504(2).
223. Id. § 679.501(3)(a), (b).
224. Id. § 679.504(3).
225. Id. § 679.504(2).
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any provisions of this code which may be inconsistent or in conflict
therewith.”226 Since the pawnbroker rules apply and take precedence, the
pawnbroker is entitled, on the pawner's default and once the period of re-
demption has expired, to retain the collateral as payment in full for the
debt,227 notwithstanding the Code provisions on redemption, compulsory
disposition of collateral, and sale of collateral by the secured party.228 No
notice is required except that printed on the pawn ticket.229 No surplus is
due the debtor and no deficiency is owing from the debtor.
If a pawn is a buy-sell, it is a purchase transaction. It is the pawnbro-
ker’s position as a purchaser that is the basis for the pawnbroker’s rights.
If the pawner does not buy back the pawn, the pawnbroker is free to sell
it. Whether the pawnbroker realized from the sale more or less than the
pawner received from the pawnbroker is of no relevance because the
transaction was characterized as a sale with an option to repurchase,
which option has expired.230
Since the restrictions and requirements imposed on pawnbroking in-
crease the pawnbroker’s cost for each transaction, pawnbrokers have at-
tempted simply to purchase the items and sell them at retail, becoming
dealers in secondhand goods. Under the current Florida regulatory
scheme, this dodge would not be entirely successful. Dealers in second-
hand goods are governed by many of the same regulations that “guide”
pawnbrokers.231 Pawnshops usually engage in both pawnbroking and gen-
eral retailing of both used and new goods.
IX.   THE LOCAL SCENE: EVEN MORE REGULATION
Nothing in this chapter shall preclude political subdivisions of the state
and municipalities from enacting laws more restrictive than the provi-
sions of this chapter.232
This Florida statute and similar ones in other jurisdictions233 declare on
pawnbrokers open season, free from requirements of sportsmanship by
the local regulators. Nor should pawnbrokers expect any favorable judi-
cial intervention, especially in light of judicial attitudes such as the fol-
lowing:
                                                                                                         
226. Id. § 671.304(2)(i).
227. Id. § 538.16.
228. Id. §§ 679.504, .505, .506.
229. Id.
230. See generally FLORIDA USURY LAW, supra note 137, § 3.18-3.21.
231. See generally FLA. STAT. §§ 538.03-.17 (1995).
232. Id. § 538.17.
233. But cf. State Association News, NAT’L PAWNBROKER, Summer 1994, at 60, 62
(stating that Ohio’s new Pawnbrokers Act includes “pre-emption from local licensure and
regulation. The state will now have sole authority over pawnshops”).
1996]                    FLORIDA PAWNBROKING 1027
[L]imiting the number of hours that pawnshops are open may make the
police surveillance of pawnshop operations easier. Limiting the opera-
tion to the normal working day [8 a.m. to 5 p.m.] may also make the
operation of the pawnshop more easily observed as more police may be
available at that time. In addition, police observation may be more ef-
fective during the daylight hours and arguably less detectable because
more people are on the streets. For these reasons, the Ordinance could
conceivably serve to chill the use of the pawnshop as a means to dis-
pose of stolen goods.234
On appeal, the trial court decision from which the above is quoted was
upheld and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals clarified the tenuous
position in which pawnbrokers are placed when local regulators are given
what appears to be nearly free rein. As the appellate court pointed out:
Business regulations such as these are reviewed under the rational basis
test. . . . This test is generally easily met. A searching inquiry into the
validity of legislative judgments concerning economic regulation is not
required . . . . To put it another way, the legislation must be sustained
if there is any conceivable basis for the legislature to believe that the
means they have selected will tend to accomplish the desired end. Even
if the court is convinced that the political branch has made an improvi-
dent, ill-advised, or unnecessary decision, it must uphold the act if it
bears a rational relation to a legitimate governmental purpose.235
To further understand how a problem arises from legislative encour-
agement of local regulation, note several findings that the appellate court
espoused or endorsed:
The Dade County Commission concluded that despite pervasive
regulation of the pawnshop industry, such businesses continued to
serve as a viable outlet for stolen property.236
                                                                                                         
234. Cash Inn of Dade, Inc., v. Metropolitan Dade County, 706 F. Supp. 844, 847 (S.D.
Fla. 1989). Could that same logic be applied to the pawnshop “Blue Law” (no pawnshop busi-
ness on Sunday)? It was not until May 1994 that the Jacksonville, Florida, City Council ap-
proved an ordinance to repeal its remaining “Blue Law” aimed at Jacksonville pawnbrokers.
Bob Meadows, District News, FLA. PAWNBROKER, Spring 1994, at 33, 33.
235. Cash Inn of Dade, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 938 F.2d 1239, 1241 (11th
Cir. 1991) (emphasis added).
236. Id. at 1242. Is this “logical” in light of the following observations?
When a pawnbroker takes in a stolen item, he loses on three levels. First, he could
lose his license. Second, chances are good that the police will confiscate the item and
the broker ends up with neither the item nor the money he paid out on it. And third,
it undermines the relationship the shop has with the local law enforcement agency.
George White, Corporate Security: Eliminating Loss from the Industry, NAT’L PAWNBROKER,
Summer 1994, at 22, 24.
A recent academic study would confirm these observations and go one step further. It is not
in the interest of pawnbrokers
to make loans on stolen goods because the police can seize the goods, and the broker
would lose the collateral and the money loaned. Given the police report requirement,
. . . it would not be in the interest of a thief to pawn stolen goods, and many
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. . . The county commission . . . is not required to support its con-
clusions with empirical data as long as the assumptions its [sic] makes
are logical.237
. . . .
. . . [T]he county admitted that the amount of stolen property dis-
covered through these means [reviewing pawnshop transactions] repre-
sented less than one percent of the property stolen within the county.238
. . . Even if the admission by the County accurately reflects the
amount of stolen goods discoverable through this method of record
keeping, it by no means suggests that this is the actual percentage of
stolen goods which pass through pawnshops.239
. . . .
. . . The question is not whether the legislation will in fact accom-
plish its goals, but whether the legislative body could rationally have
concluded that it would.240
To bolster its position and the logic behind the ordinance and the trial
decision, the appellate court retreated into the case law.
The only three cases to address this precise issue [citing a 1943 Tennes-
see state court case, a 1913 Kentucky state court case, and a 1904 Mon-
tana state court case] have all determined that municipal efforts to curb
the hours of operation for pawnshops are a rational means of attempting
to limit the sale of stolen goods. The fact that other similar statutes
[regulating adult bookstores, massage parlors, and bars] have been adopted
and sustained supports the finding that this ordinance is reasonable.241
Because of this ubiquitous assumption that pawnshops are one of the
mainstays of crime and immorality, it is no small wonder that Dade
County pawnshops were given cause to celebrate when, in 1994, their
mandatory closing hour was extended from 5 p.m. to 7 p.m.242
It is not only the hours that are of “grave” local concern but the loca-
tion of pawnshops and their number and density as well. Local govern-
ments attempt to regulate these concerns with license requirements and
zoning regulations. By scanning news items from the past few years, it
was found that: when officials in Baltimore, Maryland, limited the num-
                                                                                                         
charge[] that stolen goods are far more commonly channelled through unregulated
flea markets.
CASKEY, supra note 4, at 38.
237. Cash Inn of Dade, 938 F.2d at 1242. The question really becomes, logical to whom
and based on what information?
238. Id. at 1244.
239. Id. The court also pointed out that “[d]uring the hearing before the commission, one
of the pawnshop owners estimated that up to five percent of all items purchased by pawnshops
are stolen. In a multimillion dollar industry that figure is not insubstantial.” Id. Such assertions
are not substantiated by fact.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1244-45 (citations omitted).
242. President’s Corner, FLA. PAWNBROKER, Fall 1994, at 4, 4.
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ber of pawnshops in the city to forty-two (the extant number),243 Baltimore
County officials became concerned that the suburbs would be overrun
with pawnshops so they were attempting to limit density in the county
area surrounding the city of Baltimore;244 the City Council of Fairfax,
Virginia, voted to limit the number of pawnshops to one;245 New Orleans
was attempting to exclude new pawnshops from the tourist areas of the
city;246 in Marborough, Missouri, a pawnbroker withdrew his business li-
cense application after it was tabled by the village Board of Trustees be-
cause the Board was opposed to the business (there was no ordinance
banning pawnshops) and, at about the same time, the Breckenridge Hills,
Missouri City Council refused to remove pawn shops from its list of pro-
hibited businesses;247 Philadelphia had begun more aggressively to enforce
zoning laws to crack down on “nuisance businesses” such as pawn-
shops;248 in the wake of growth in the number of pawnshops, a near dou-
bling in three years, the Aurora, Colorado City Council imposed a six-
month moratorium on new pawnbroker licenses249 and then drafted an or-
dinance that would prevent any new pawnshop from opening within a
two-mile radius of an existing shop.250 Assuredly, such local decisions
hamper, if not destroy, local competition and thereby encourage monop-
oly practices. The local citizens are not well served by such regulation.
Capital or asset requirements, bond and license fee impositions, and
demonstration of either a showing of need or of “convenience and advan-
tage” are the various methods used by local governments to restrict pawn-
shop numbers. Contemporary examples abound. Baltimore’s new pawn-
shop ordinance increased the bond requirement from $10,000 to
$50,000;251 Jacksonville, Florida pawnbrokers ask “Why does the occupa-
tional license for pawnbrokers cost 8 to 10 times more then [sic] nearly every
other occupational license in Jacksonville?”;252 Wheat Ridge, Colorado city
                                                                                                         
243. See News Notes, TODAY’S PAWNBROKER, Fall 1994, at 36, 36. Baltimore’s pawn
ordinance was spurred by the growth of the number of pawnshops in the city; their numbers
tripled in five years. News Notes, TODAY’S PAWNBROKER, Summer 1994, at 37, 40.
244. See News Notes, TODAY’S PAWNBROKER, Summer 1995, at 38, 40-41; see also News
Notes, TODAY’S PAWNBROKER, Fall 1994, at 36, 36.
245. The burden placed on police department resources was cited as the reason. News
Notes, TODAY’S PAWNBROKER, Fall 1994, at 36, 36.
246. News Notes, TODAY’S PAWNBROKER, Summer 1995, at 38, 41.
247. News Notes, TODAY’S PAWNBROKER, Fall 1995, at 36, 40. Both communities are St.
Louis, Missouri, suburbs.
248. Id. at 42.
249. News Notes, TODAY’S PAWNBROKER, Summer 1994, at 37, 46.
250. “Supporters say they want to avoid a ‘pawnshop row.’” “[S]ome city pawnbrokers
support the ordinance because it would limit competition.” News Notes, TODAY’S PAWN-
BROKER, Fall 1994, at 36, 36.
251. Id.
252. District News, FLA. PAWNBROKER, Spring 1994, at 33, 33.
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officials and pawnbrokers compromised on licensing and transaction fees.253
The compromise fees will cost the city’s two pawnshops about $38,000.254
And on the international scene, in the wake of rapid growth in the number of
pawnshops, officials in Windsor, Ontario, Canada, sought to have the pawn-
shop license fee raised from $100 to $3,000, security bonds raised from
$2,000 to $50,000, and photographs and thumbprints required of all pawn-
shop customers.255
X.   HOW MUCH CAN IT COST?256
A.   The Price Is Right
In most sectors of our economy, we instinctively reject price controls, but
not with the price of credit. Early justifications for such price controls were
based both on moral and religious grounds and the general theory that capital
is nonproductive.257 Modern justifications for price controls are more reactive;
when articulated, they focus on concepts such as “fairness,”
“conscionability,” “bargaining disparity,” or “paternalism.” One legal com-
mentator emphasizes that “[o]ther loan hybrids . . . often charge similarly
outrageous rates . . . . Freed from usury controls . . . rates for more tradi-
tional loans have spiraled out of control . . . . These astounding rates evidence
that free market control offers borrowers scant protection . . . .”258 And, as a
U.S. Senator thoughtfully asked, “At what point does a rate become so high
that society expresses the judgment that it is unconscionable and that the indi-
vidual must do without the credit rather than pay the unconscionably high
rates?”259 Factors such as the costs of providing the credit, the effects on
competition among credit providers, and the resulting credit rationing of-
ten get lost in the emotional melee.
Modern “free market” scholars may well suggest that it would be un-
wise to set any upper limit. But even if it could be agreed that regardless
                                                                                                         
253. News Notes, TODAY’S PAWNBROKER, Summer 1994, at 46, 48. The city’s original
proposal of an annual $10,000 license fee was reduced to $5000 and the one dollar per trans-
action fee was reduced to 60 cents per transaction. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 40.
256. Implicit interest rate ceilings range from 1.5% per month to 25% per month. See
Oeltjen, America, supra note 103, at 233-87.
257. See Oeltjen, Usury, supra note 96, at 171-80. A recent article, Steven W. Bender,
Rate Regulation at the Crossroads of Usury and Unconscionability: The Case for Regulating
Abusive Commercial and Consumer Interest Under the Unconscionability Standard, 31 HOUS.
L. REV. 721 (1994), “builds on the argument that the usury solution is flawed and urges a
compromise between usury and market control that employs the variable fairness standard of
unconscionability to police unfair interest pricing.” Id. at 725.
258. Bender, supra note 257, at 724-25.
259. This framing of the issue as a question of morals was presented by Senator Paul H.
Douglas in testimony before the Massachusetts Legislature in 1969. See Oeltjen, Usury, supra
note 96, at 207 n.283.
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of the economic consequences, beyond some point the rate of charge is
“unconscionable” and should be disallowed, much debate would be
needed to determine the magic tipping point. From English and colonial
law arose a "six percent myth" that has long affected consumers' expec-
tations and legislators' speeches.260 Past attempts to set realistic limits
have run into severe criticism. On occasion, even social reformers have
endorsed a high rate of interest. “[It’s] unbelievable . . . that the Russell
Sage Foundation was able to sell many legislatures in the United States
[as part of the Uniform Small Loan Act proposal] an interest rate of 3
1/2% per month, or 42% per annum, as a reasonable rate of interest.”261
A somewhat lower interest rate drew outrage from one judge: “To give
persons a right to charge 36 percent-plus interest [or finance charge]
shocks at least my conscience and I do not believe that I am unduly sensi-
tive.”262
Largely ignored is the fact that pawnbrokers must charge high rates in
order to survive in the business. The rates charged cannot be assumed in-
variably to create profits. As in any risky, market-driven business, pawn-
broking profits are dependent on a variety of factors, many of which are
out of the control of the pawnshop owner. The high security-related costs
as well as insurance coverage prevent pawnshops from making exorbitant
profits.263 Also, the pawnbroker’s inventory of goods is susceptible to ob-
solescence and consequent loss of demand; this is especially true for high-
tech electronic devices. Such unpredictability in market demand only
contributes to the risk a pawnbroker takes in accepting pawned items.
Furthermore, pawnshops can flourish only when customer demand in-
creases.
Under some circumstances, economic justification for price regulation
might be argued. Two plausible economic rationales for controls on the
price of credit are that (1) the credit market is sufficiently imperfect that
consumers seldom pay a negotiated (bargain-generated) price for their use
of credit; and (2) within a given credit market, suppliers may have mo-
                                                                                                         
260. See Oeltjen, Parade, supra note 9, at 771. Influenced by English law, many of the
colonies in the eighteenth century established a lawful rate of six percent. Thus arose a prevail-
ing view that six percent was a proper rate. See Oeltjen, Usury, supra note 96, at 174. “A ‘6%
myth’ is found by many investigators to be the basis of consumers’ expectations about the
normal charge for credit. . . . [T]he type of state legislator who is always ready to defend
motherhood and the American flag has a field day with any effort to breach visibly the 6%
ceiling.” Homer Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68
COLUM. L. REV. 445, 447 (1968).
261. Allen McReynolds, Legislative Remedies Possible Under the Missouri Constitution of
1945, 16 MO. L. REV. 292, 295 (1951). The Russell Sage Foundation was incorporated in
New York in 1907 for the purpose of improving social conditions. Id. at 294.
262. Oeltjen, Usury, supra note 96, at 208 (quoting The Honorable George Brun, a Ber-
keley, California municipal court judge).
263. Hudson, Should Regulators Check Up on Check Cashers?, BUS. & SOC’Y REV., 1993, at
47.
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nopoly power such that, even with perfect knowledge, borrowers may be
charged excessive fees for their use of credit.
One of the more troublesome market imperfections is that many con-
sumers do not perceive that they can effectively shop for credit. This mis-
perception is based on ignorance of the variety of alternatives, including
lack of knowledge regarding other pawnshops where the rate may be
lower, the value of the pawn higher, and the terms less onerous. There
may also be other viable alternatives to pawnshop credit. These market
imperfections seem not to be influenced by disclosure provisions, such as
those required by Truth-in-Lending.264 Disclosure may raise the con-
sciousness of the debtor, and the information gained may discourage the
borrower, but, in general, studies have tended to indicate that consumers
have a high degree of insensitivity to the level of credit charges.265 Disclo-
sure only makes apparent what you are paying, not what you might have
paid, had you shopped elsewhere. Even if you shop, you may not be
shopping for the price of credit.
Interestingly, pawnbrokers also say that most of their customers pay
little attention to the interest rate or other fees on the loan. Their con-
cern is the amount that the broker will lend on the collateral. Conse-
quently, brokers say that pawnshops compete among themselves more
on the basis of which one will make the largest loan relative to the col-
lateral than they do on the basis of interest rates. Brokers attribute such
customer behavior to a necessity to raise a certain amount of cash to
meet a particular expenditure and to careless intertemporal budget-
ing.266
Another market imperfection is the tendency of pawnshops to have, or
be granted, a local monopoly.267 For the person seeking to pawn goods,
there is no national market, no state market, and, as a practical matter,
probably no market outside the pawner’s neighborhood.268 If there is only
one local pawnshop, then there is little or no incentive to engage in any
form of competition.
There are any number of reasons why there may be a lone pawnshop:
the community may be just too small to support more than one pawnshop,
or the community may not generate sufficient business if the volume of
transactions necessary to survive is kept artificially high by relatively low
interest rate ceilings or high license fees, bonding, capital, or net worth
                                                                                                         
264. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693(r) (1994).
265. See Oeltjen, Parade, supra note 9, at 771-72, and authorities cited therein.
266. CASKEY, supra note 4, at 71.
267. Many of the attempts to regulate pawnbroking, and especially those at the local gov-
ernment level, end up creating a situation in which the existing pawnshops can exert monopoly
power. See Oeltjen, America, supra note 103, at 233-87.
268. "Because . . . transactions are quite small, customers tend to patronize the most con-
veniently located shops even if more distant shops charge slightly less for their services.”
CASKEY, supra note 4, at 114; see also Oeltjen, Parade, supra note 9, at 772.
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requirements.269 It is also possible that there may be regulatory limitations
on pawnshop density or other zoning-type impediments intended to avoid
a “pawnshop row.” These restrictions are enacted in the name of con-
sumer protection, crime prevention, pawnshop profitability, or neighbor-
hood integrity. The effect is to grant existing or “winning” shops a local
monopoly.270 Solo pawnshops are especially likely to exercise monopoly
power when the pawner is a relatively poor credit risk; for such persons,
there are few other sources of credit.271
“Local monopoly, how so? There’s another pawnshop in the next
county, only a ten- or fifteen-minute ride away.” This proffered alterna-
tive will not significantly diminish the monopoly power. The availability
and cost of transportation now becomes the deterrent to competition:
many of those whom the pawnshop serves may not have adequate trans-
portation; the item to be pawned may be bulky and not easily movable
even ten miles; the amount of the loan is likely very small, a factor mak-
ing the relative cost of transportation quite high.272
If pawners have no other legitimate sources of liquidity, and they
probably do not, they will be denied access to the desired credit if rates
are set so low or the barriers so high that pawnshops can no longer prof-
itably operate. Potential pawners’ “needs and wants” will not be easily
moralized or legislated away. It is in such an atmosphere that loan sharks
flourish.273
If the rates are set just high enough for the pawnshops to survive but
not thrive, it is predictable that pawnbrokers will reduce the pawn value,
the amount they would otherwise be willing to loan on a given item of
                                                                                                         
269. For examples of such cost-raising regulations, see Oeltjen, America, supra note 103, at 233-87.
270. CASKEY, supra note 4, at 121-22:
Economically sophisticated pawnbrokers are well aware that the way to raise their
long-run profitability is to create barriers to entry into the business. In several states,
pawnshop organizations have been lobbying to add clauses to state regulations that
would prohibit new shops from opening within a certain distance of existing shops or
that would require potential new owners to prove that they possess significant capi-
tal. . . . [Also there are regulations under which] the owner must show a public need
for and probable profitability of an additional pawnshop. Such barriers to entry are
in the interests of pawnbrokers—but not in the public interest.
271. Banks, credit unions, and consumer finance companies may well be unavailable or the
application process may take too long.
A related problem that defies workable regulation is one of oversupply or overextension of
credit. When borrowers have more obligations than they can afford, their sources for addi-
tional credit are quite limited.
272. "[P]awnbroking is characterized by high customer transportation costs relative to the
size of the transaction . . . . [T]ransportation costs per dollar of credit are significant, and
customers generally patronize the closest shop.” CASKEY, supra note 4, at 49-50.
273. See Oeltjen, Usury, supra note 96, at 217-21 (discussing loansharking) (note authori-
ties cited therein).
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property.274 The effects of such an adjustment are that the pawnbroker
would then have a lower cost basis in each unredeemed item and could
achieve a larger profit margin on resale and those persons unable to re-
deem would pay proportionally more for their liquidity than those who are
able to redeem. Costs of a pawnbroking system that should be borne
equally by all pawners are shifted to those persons who can least afford it,
the pawners who are unable to redeem. Overall, the uncontrolled vari-
able—assigned pawn value—should come into equilibrium with the regu-
lated variable—the rate of interest—to yield an entrepreneurial return
commensurate with risk and costs. This rate of return generally escapes
regulation.275
B.   Money Isn’t Everything: Nonrate Factors276
Nonrate regulatory factors can also have a significant impact on both
the cost of utilizing a pawnbroker and the availability of pawn shops. In
those jurisdictions that either have fairly high or no legislative limit on the
interest rates that can be charged by pawnbrokers,277 most nonrate regula-
tory factors will have limited direct effect on the availability of pawn-
shop-granted credit. To the extent that such regulations increase the cost
of business, these costs will be passed on to the pawners. It is unlikely
that these potential borrowers will be able to fulfill their credit needs or
desires elsewhere because pawnbrokers tend to be lenders of last resort.278
There is some price that most borrowers would be unwilling to
pay;279 likewise, there is surely a level of regulation beyond which few
entrepreneurs could,280 or would be willing to, invest in a pawnbroking
                                                                                                         
274. A side effect of the reduction of pawn value is that as the loan amount, pawn value
ratio decreases, the consumer must pawn an increasingly larger proportion of his or her goods
for a given amount of credit.
275. Except in those situations where the pawnbroker is regulated like a utility. For a discussion
of this possibility, see Oeltjen, Parade, supra note 9, at 780-83; Oeltjen, Usury, supra note 96, at
221-22.
276. Some states, such as Iowa, North Dakota and West Virginia, appear to have no state
statutory regulation of pawnbrokers. Many other states have enacted “comprehensive” regula-
tory schemes. See Oeltjen, America, supra note 103, at 233-87 (note survey).
277. Approximately 15 states have no state statutes regulating pawnbroker interest rates;
another 12 states have statutory rates that are comparatively high. Id. In many states it may
be possible that there are local interest regulations (e.g., Massachusetts). Id. at 258. In one state,
Utah, local governmental units are statutorily prohibited from engaging in rate setting. Id. at 282.
278. Pawnbrokers are at least the last “legal” alternative, and it is highly unlikely that
loansharks would resort to price competition with legitimate lenders.
279. In most cases, this amount would necessarily generate an extremely high Annual Per-
centage Rate (APR) because, as has been pointed out, the transaction is generally quite small
and the period of the credit is quite short so the dollar amount that is being assessed does not
seem particularly burdensome, e.g., a $20 service charge for a $50 loan for one month would
generate an APR of approximately 480%.
280. Indeed, such a jurisdiction would be where an aspiring pawnbroker would need to
show “convenience and advantage” to be licensed and the regulatory body determined that
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operation.281 The potential irony is that the various types of regulation that
would prove quite costly to the affected pawnbrokers could also be of
great benefit to established pawnbrokers, when the regulations facilitate
barriers to entry of their potential pawnbroking competitors. This pawn-
brokers’ benefit would be at pawners’ expense as they encounter monop-
oly power.
1.   Licensing282
Pawnbrokers may be required to be licensed by the state, by local gov-
ernmental entities, or both. A majority of the states have statutes that
mandate licenses, and a number of these jurisdictions require the licensing
function to be carried out by local authorities.283 Some states have statutes
that explicitly empower local agencies to license but do not mandate li-
censing.284 Florida both requires state licensing (registration) and permits
local licensing.285
To the extent that the licensing statute requires little more than notifi-
cation to the governmental entity that a person is going to enter into the
business of pawnbroking286 and the payment of a small administrative fee,
licensing would have little or no economic or competitive effect. Even
when licensing statutes require that licenses be issued only to persons or
                                                                                                         
additional pawnbroking outlets were not needed. Another example would be where there was a
city ordinance establishing a moratorium on new licenses.
281. In those jurisdictions in which extremely low rate ceilings already challenge even the
spirit of any pawnbroker, excessively restrictive nonrate regulations would extinguish it.
282. During the drafting of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, the determination of
proper criteria for governing licensees proved to be such a headache that
[a]t one point in the deliberations on the Code the Committee actually voted to junk
the licensing concept as a useless and expensive anachronism. Though this action
was taken in the heady atmosphere of the concluding minutes of an exhausting three-
day meeting and was notably short-lived (its reversal was the first order of business
at the next meeting), it is of interest that, in the recollection of the authors, both in-
dustry and consumer representatives supported the decision.
Robert L. Jordan & William D. Warran, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLUM. L.
REV. 387, 430 (1968).
283. Connecticut (local), Delaware (only in New Castle County), District of Columbia
(state), Hawaii (state), Idaho (state), Indiana (state), Kansas (local), Louisiana (state), Mary-
land (state), Michigan (local), Mississippi (local), Montana (local), Nebraska (state), New Jer-
sey (state), New Mexico (local), New York (local), North Carolina (local), Ohio (state), Okla-
homa (state), Oregon (state), Pennsylvania (state), Rhode Island (local), South Carolina (state),
South Dakota (local), Tennessee (state), Texas (local), and Vermont (local) all have mandatory
licensing. See Oeltjen, America, supra note 103, at 233-87.
284. This category includes Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. Id.
285. FLA. STAT. § 538.09 (state registration), § 538.17 (local prerogative) (1995).
286. A “notification” type of license application would need to ask little information be-
yond (a) the name of the owner; (b) the name of the business; (c) the address of the office if
different from the place of business; (d) the addresses of all locations at which such business is
conducted; and probably (e) the name and address of the designated agent for service of proc-
ess. Changes in information could be reported at the next annual renewal.
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corporations whose officers are free of felony convictions or are of good
moral character,287 the economic or competitive impact would be minimal.
Competitive impact begins when licenses are rationed by a quota sys-
tem (e.g., one pawnshop per 3000 in population), a moratorium on new
shops, a standard such as “convenience and advantage,”288 or minimum
capital or net worth requirements. When and if available, the license be-
comes much more costly, potential competitors are kept out of the mar-
ket, and those with licenses have less competitive incentive.289 Pricing and
other excesses would predictably increase the clamor for rate regulation.
2.   State Bond Requirements
Like onerous licensing or minimum capital requirements, excessive
bonding requirements can have anticompetitive effects. An expensive
bond premium may sink an otherwise marginal operation. To the extent
that bonds are reasonably necessary to ensure that pawnbrokers carry out
their agreements with the borrowers and provide a source of recompense
if they do not, such bonding requirements might be justifiable or even
desirable. But to the extent that, in purpose or amount, bond requirements
bear no reasonable relation to this surety function, they would seem to be
little more than arbitrary and capricious impediments to profitability or
market entry; the size of the required bond is not based on the value of
the pawn or other potential loss. Of the states that have bond require-
                                                                                                         
287. See FLA. STAT. § 538.09(5) (1995), summarized supra note 143.
288. The “convenience and advantage” criteria originated in the fifth draft of the Uniform
Small Loan Law in 1932. F.B. Hubachek, Progress and Problems in Regulation of Consumer
Credit, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 4, 17 (1954). The provision was an attempt to curtail ex-
cesses resulting from a very competitive market. James M. Sullivan, Administration of a
Regulatory Small Loan Law, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 146, 148 (1941). It was feared that
free entry would cause a great influx of lenders into the market, drive lenders to illegal means
to make profits, and stabilize rates at the maximum allowable, factors which would actually
defeat competition.
289. As stated in the Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 3-503, Comments 1 & 2:
The purpose [of keeping licensing requirements at a minimum] is to facilitate entry
into the cash loan field so that the resultant rate competition fostered by disclosure
will generally force rates [down].
. . . A secondary purpose is to reduce the likelihood of establishing localized mo-
nopolies in the granting of cash credit. Such monopolies tend to push rates charged
to the maximum permitted levels and to establish conditions under which some share
of the anticipated monopoly profits are devoted to direct or indirect pressures to ob-
tain the license.
U.C.C.C. § 3-503 cmt. 1 & 2 (1985). In conjunction with recommendations for increased
maximum rate allowances, the National Commission on Consumer Finance recommended
“that the only criterion for entry (license) in the finance company segment of the consumer
credit market be good character and that the right to market entry not be based on any mini-
mum capital requirements or convenience and advantage regulations.” NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES 138 (1972).
Though directed toward consumer finance company regulation, the above recommendation
would seem even more pertinent to pawnbroker regulation.
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ments, Oregon has the highest—$25,000290—with New York in second
place—$10,000.291 Massachusetts has the smallest—$300.292 Of the other
jurisdictions, $1000 and $5000 bond requirements seem the most popular,
with six states each.293 Three states have bond requirements of $500 and
$2000; one state requires a $3,000 bond.294 With the exception of Oregon
and New York, current state bonding requirements would not seem to be
unreasonable; they would have minimal influence on the number of pawn-
broking outlets. Supplementary local bond requirements could significantly
affect this equation.
3.   Capital and Net Worth Requirements
Appropriate capital and net worth requirements arguably insure pawn-
broker responsibility and sound business practices. Pawnbrokers who can
raise the specified capital or who can show the requisite net worth have
proof of their creditworthiness or business acumen; arguably, they have
something to lose through inappropriate conduct. A clever operator with
intent to bilk can beg, borrow, or steal whatever is needed to satisfy this
type of requirement. The question is, when judgment day arrives, do the
pawners and other victims of the pawnbroker’s wrongdoing have a source
from which to receive compensation? The capital or net worth may well
have vanished.295 Capital and net worth requirements are little more than
barriers to entry of new competitors. It has been recognized that “[s]uch
barriers to entry are in the interests of pawnbrokers—but not in the public
interest.”296 Realistic bonding requirements designed to protect the
pawner/customer297 are significantly preferable.
4.   Sales Surplus
Whenever pawns are not redeemed by the end of the contract or statu-
tory holding period, the pawnbroker is authorized to sell the pawn.298 Ab-
sent contrary agreement, to the extent that the sales proceeds exceed the
amount extended on the pawn plus service charges, the pawnbroker has re-
                                                                                                         
290. OR. REV. STAT. § 726.070 (1995).
291. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 41 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
292. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 140, § 79 (West 1996).
293. Oeltjen, America, supra note 103, at 233-87.
294. Id.
295. There would seem to be little difference in theory between the situation under discus-
sion and the automobile problem. Automobile drivers are capable of causing significant dam-
age. Is proof of capital or net worth a prerequisite to automobile registration? In the automo-
bile case, insurance is the answer.
296. CASKEY, supra note 4, at 122.
297. In some jurisdictions, the bonds are not for the protection of the pawner or customer
but are to insure the pawnbrokers’ faithful performance of the statutory requirements. See
Oeltjen, America, supra note 103, at 233-87.
298. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 538.16(1) (1995).
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ceived additional income. And, to the extent that the sales proceeds are less
than the amount extended on the pawn, there is a deficiency that the pawnbro-
ker must suffer because he or she cannot recover losses from the pawner.299
Any legislative scheme to alter this result, e.g., to require the pawn-
broker to pay any surplus to the debtor,300 would detrimentally impact the
pawnbroking industry and pawners in general. For example, surplus re-
payment rules would interact negatively with interest rate ceilings.301 In
jurisdictions that have relatively high or no interest rate ceilings, pawn-
brokers would offset the loss of such surplus repayment by charging
higher rates of interest to pawners. Fewer pawners would be able to re-
deem their pawns, sales would proliferate, and purchasers at sales would
gain windfalls at the expense of pawners. In jurisdictions with low interest
rate ceilings, surplus repayment would foreclose profitability and thereby
eliminate the industry; pawners would usually have no alternatives for
obtaining loans. In all jurisdictions, bookkeeping, trust accounting, and
location of pawners for repayment would be onerous responsibilities. In
order to effect repayment with any degree of order, sales would likely
take the form of auctions, rather than shop transactions. Auctions, instead
of store sales, would necessarily result in lower, and even deficient,
prices rather than surpluses. Any such legislative design must be rejected
as destructive of the industry and nonbeneficial to borrowers.
5.   Summary
Pawnshops are accepted by many as valuable financial institutions—
sources of credit for those who have no legitimate credit access. For the
sake of customers who avail themselves of this service, the temptation to
regulate excessively should be resisted. Where pawnshop regulation is al-
ready a factor in causing anticompetitive and monopolistic behavior,
regulations should be reviewed and selectively revised or repealed.302
                                                                                                         
299. This fact makes valuing the potential pawn one of the keys to profitability. Too low a
valuation and the potential pawner walks away; an excessive valuation and the pawnbroker has the
potential to lose capital. Neither alternative fosters employment longevity for the employee making
the valuation.
The Mexican National Pawnshop may have the answer. It pays highly trained and skilled
pawn appraisers a salary plus a commission on loans they extend. But any tendency to extend
large loans to increase the commission from the transaction is negated. “If the appraiser makes
a mistake and overvalues the pawn, or is duped, or is so touched by a sad story that he extends
too high a loan, he is charged for any difference between the amount of the loan extended and
the sale price of the pawn.” Oeltjen, supra note 15, at 66.
300. "At least fifteen states require the surplus to be made available to the borrower, but
there is no corresponding requirement that the borrower be responsible for deficiencies.”
Oeltjen, Parade, supra note 9, at 787.
301. Id. at 788.
302. See Lewis A. Engman, How Government Regulation Has Become the Curse of Con-
sumerism, BARRISTER, Winter 1975, at 58. See generally S. Hugh High, Consumer Credit
Regulation in Texas—A Rejoinder by an Economist, 50 TEX. L. REV. 463 (1972); Allison
Dunham, Research for Uniform Consumer Credit Legislation, 20 BUS. LAW. 997 (1965).
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XI.   PROPERTY, PAWNBROKERS, AND POLICE
A.   Taking Care of Business: The Record-Keeping Function
“Policing regulations” also increase the costs of pawnbroker opera-
tions. Pawnshops have proverbially been identified as natural candidates
for fencing criminal “booty.” This “attribute” certainly led to the policing
regulations that virtually every state has enacted.303 The basic requirement
under these regulations is the transaction-recording requirement. In most
states, pawnbrokers must keep records of all pawn transactions as to the
date, the pawner’s name and address, and a description of the pawned
property.304 Various jurisdictions require expanded information about the
terms of the pawn contract and a variety of personal detail about the
pawner.305 In addition to these recording requirements, most states also
have provisions authorizing inspection of the records by specified offi-
cials306 and/or provisions requiring transmission of the records to desig-
nated officials.307 These recording, reporting, inspecting, and transmitting
requirements have become much easier as a growing percentage of the
pawnshop records are computerized.308
These regulations seem to work. Professional thieves aware that pawn-
shops report receipt of goods to the police will fence elsewhere. Like-
wise, there is little incentive for pawnbrokers to buy “hot” items because
they risk prosecution, loss of license, or at least loss of the loan proceeds
plus the pawn if the property is impounded and ultimately returned to its
rightful owner or sold.
To the extent that the policing regulations facilitate the identification and
recovery of stolen property and serve to deter fencing operations, the report-
ing requirements are reasonable burdens to impose on the pawnshops and
their customers. However, when the records are used as a resource for
                                                                                                         
303. Oeltjen, America, supra note 103, at 231.
304. Id.
305. Id. Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, Ne-
vada, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Utah. Id.; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. §
538.04(1)(c) (1995).
306. Oeltjen, America, supra note 103, at 238-87. E.g., in Florida, “[t]he premises and
required records of each secondhand dealer are subject to inspection during regular business
hours by the police department . . . by the sheriff’s department . . . and by any state law en-
forcement officer who has jurisdiction over the dealer.” FLA. STAT. § 538.05(1) (1995).
307. Oeltjen, America, supra note 103, at 238-87. E.g., Florida has the following provi-
sion: “Within 24 hours of the acquisition of any secondhand goods by purchase or pledge as
security for a loan, a secondhand dealer shall deliver to the police department . . . or . . . the
sheriff’s department . . . a record of the transaction . . . .” FLA. STAT. § 538.04(1) (1995).
308. Programs with names such as PAWN POWER, CompuPawn and CompuPawn-LITE,
PawnMaster®, Pawn Manager©, MR. PAWN, PAWN PRO II®, LOANArrangerÔ,
PAWNDEX®, Auto Pro and PawnMax®, The Pawnshop, QuickPawn, and MUNZ Pawn Sys-
tem have been advertised in the various issues of Today’s Pawnbroker, The Florida Pawnbro-
ker, and National Pawnbroker.
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“fishing” by public authorities309 or made accessible to the pawnbroker’s
competitors310 and others, the record and reporting requirements quickly be-
come intrusive and unreasonable. Such use should not be permitted.311
B.   Search and Seizure: Pawnbrokers Are Persons Too
Imagine being a legitimate businessperson providing the valuable serv-
ice of extending credit to individuals in the community who would not
customarily receive credit. Further, imagine complying with all state
laws regarding the business including a provision that requires you to
maintain a detailed record noting all of the inventory of your business.
Finally, suppose one day the police seize, retain, and ultimately dispose
of a good portion of your inventory without providing you any com-
pensation for the disposition. Life in the former Soviet Union or some
Third World country? Unfortunately not. Events such as this are com-
monplace in many states; the unfortunate victims are pawnbrokers,
who before the disposition had merely extended credit in the course of
their business in return for taking an interest in the items which the po-
lice later seize and sell for their own benefit.312
Maybe in other states but surely never in Florida. Hopefully not again
but there was a time. . . . In Florida Pawnbrokers and Secondhand Deal-
ers Association, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale,313 a federal district court
held unconstitutional a state statute authorizing police officers to seize,
without notice and hearing, allegedly stolen property from a pawnbroker.314
                                                                                                         
309. "The guys in Organized Crime frequently use their terminal to run names of sus-
pected felons. When things are slow, they query the pawnshop records database for criminal
profiles.” Ric Blum, George Orwell Was 10 Years Early, NAT’L PAWNBROKER, Spring 1994,
at 50, 52. Also, traffic violation authorities research data banks to update addresses in the Bu-
reau of Motor Vehicles records. Id.
310. "There was a case where a pawnbroker went down to the local law enforcement agency
and asked to view the pawn records for the entire city. . . . What were they (sic) up to? . . . They
were recording the names and addresses of those who made high-dollar loans. Then, they would
write the pledgers a letter to try to persuade them to do business with their pawnshop.” Id. at 53.
311. See generally FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
312. Steve H. Nickels & Edward S. Adams, Pawnbrokers, Police, and Property Rights—A
Proposed Constitutional Balance, 47 ARK. L. REV. 793 (1994).
313. 699 F. Supp. 888 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
314. Id. at 890 (holding unconstitutional FLA. STAT. § 715.041(2) (1987) (repealed by
1989, Fla. Laws ch. 89-533)). The statute read as follows:
(2) The lawful owner of any stolen property in the possession of a pawnbroker may
recover such property by informing any law enforcement agency of the location of
such property and providing the agency with proof of ownership of the property,
provided a timely report of the theft of the property was made to the proper authori-
ties. Upon the receipt of such proof, any law enforcement officer authorized by the
police chief or sheriff, or the delegate thereof, in the jurisdiction where the property
is found, may recover the property from the pawnbroker, without expense to the law-
ful owner thereof, unless the pawnbroker presents evidence of having received proof of
ownership of such property by the person who sold it to the pawnbroker or pledged the
property as security for a loan. Any property recovered from a pawnbroker pursuant to
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On several occasions, Fort Lauderdale police officers had seized pawn
property in accordance with the challenged statute.315 The court held that
the pawnbroker’s possessory interest constituted property,316 that the po-
lice officers’ actions constituted state action,317 and that the pawnbroker
was deprived of that property318 without the procedural safeguards guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment.319 Since the basic action had been
brought under section 1983 of the United States Code,320 the court not
only declared the statute unconstitutional but enjoined its enforcement and
gave the plaintiffs leave to file a motion for damages, attorney’s fees, and
costs.321
The Florida Legislature quickly repealed the defective statute and re-
placed it with a provision more likely to pass constitutional muster.322 The
“new” provision, with only clarifying modification, is still in force to-
day.323 There are no provisions for police seizure, and to recover his or
her property, the alleged owner must bring an action in replevin.324 Though
Florida seems to have solved its “problem” in this regard, unconstitutional
seizures of property from pawnbrokers are still possible in many jurisdic-
tions.325
                                                                                                         
this section shall be returned to the lawful owner subject to its use as evidence in any
criminal proceeding.
FLA. STAT. § 715.041(2) (1987) (repealed by 1989, Fla. Laws ch. 89-533) (emphasis added).
315. Florida Pawnbrokers, 669 F. Supp. at 889.
316. Id. at 890 (“It is clear that Florida caselaw [sic] recognizes the bailee’s interest as a
form of property.”).
317. Id. at 889.
318. Id. at 890-91 (“[E]ven a temporary loss of possessory rights in chattels is a significant
abridgement of Fourteenth Amendment rights. . . . The Supreme Court has recognized that
mere possessory rights are protected property.”).
319. Id. at 891-92. “While the defendant may contend that the pawnbroker’s opportunity
of a ‘hearing’ before the police officer satisfies due process, few would hold that a police offi-
cial seizing pawned property is an impartial decisionmaker possessed of the legal training suf-
ficient to resolve conflicting claims to property.” Id. at 892.
320. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
321. Florida Pawnbrokers, 699 F. Supp. at 893.
322. 1989, Fla. Laws ch. 89-533. The provision was cleaned up again the next year. 1990,
Fla. Laws ch. 90-97.
323. FLA. STAT. § 538.08 (1995).
324. Id.
325. See Nickles & Adams, supra note 312. As recently as October 1, 1993, a new Montana
statute was enacted (the law having been passed by the Legislature with no opposition) to allow law
enforcement officials to go into any Montana pawnshop, without a search warrant, and seize
anything suspected of being stolen. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-212 (1993).
In the summer of 1994, it was reported that the California pawnbrokers’ association encour-
aged the filing of two lawsuits challenging unconstitutional search and seizures and that it has
two additional actions on hold. State Association News, NAT’L PAWNBROKER, Summer 1994,
at 60, 60. On February 2, 1995, the headlines in Buffalo, N.Y., read: “2 O.J. Trophies,
Seized by Police, Focus of Dispute, Pawnshop Wants Them Back.” 2 O.J. Trophies, Seized by
Police, Focus of Dispute, Pawnshop Wants Them Back, BUFFALO NEWS, Feb. 2, 1995, at B1.
In that summer, a pawnshop bought the Simpson trophies for $300. In January 1995, police
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XII.   TRANSITION
No one would disagree that pawnbrokers have received, and perhaps
even earned, a checkered reputation, but it is hoped that those incidents of
troubling behavior and attitudes that gave rise to the stereotype are a thing
of the past. As pawnshops fill various needs and wants in our economy,
pawnbrokers are being accepted as a valuable part of our community. In
the future, their businesses should continue to earn respect and be treated
by the business community on a par with other retail and financial opera-
tions. To expedite this transition, the pawnbroking industry should facili-
tate organized, scholarly study of the pawnbroking industry as well as
discussion, promulgation, and adoption of uniform pawnbroking legisla-
tion.
There are few contemporary studies of pawnshops with regard to their
legal, economic, sociological, or psychological impact.326 All forms of
reviews, critiques, commentaries, and even “complaints” are sources of
valuable feedback the collection of which should be encouraged by the
pawnbroking industry. Through the assimilation and analysis of such data,
the pawnbroking industry can be encouraged and assisted to develop
measures to invalidate the lingering negative perceptions and establish
pawnbroking as an essential, consumer-friendly industry. One such meas-
ure would be the advancement of uniform legislation.
The extreme jurisdictional diversity of regulations applicable to pawn-
broking327 creates an environment for enormous differences in pawnbroker
economic well-being and pawnshop availability.328 The systematic study of
the varying effects of this regulatory diversity could well offer valuable
guideposts for model, uniform regulation.
                                                                                                         
seized the trophies, claimed they were stolen, and were going to return them to Simpson. News
Notes, TODAY’S PAWNBROKER, Summer 1995, at 43, 43.
326. The Caskey, Nickels and Adams, and Oeltjen works, cited and quoted supra, are the
only major pawnbroking studies of the last several decades. See notes 4, 9, 15, 96, 103, and
312, supra, for the titles and cites to these studies.
327. See, e.g., Oeltjen, America, supra note 103, at 233-87 for a collection of state pawnbroker
laws.
328. As discussed earlier, economically restrictive pawnbroker regulations result in the ra-
tioning or unavailability of pawnbroker services. This unavailability can, in turn, drive bor-
rowers to less desirable sources, e.g., patronizing illegal lenders or writing checks on insuffi-
cient funds, the costs for either of which can be significant.
